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TULSA LAW JOURNAL
Volume 20 Winter 1984 Number 2
SERVICE OF PROCESS UNDER THE
OKLAHOMA PLEADING CODE
Charles W. Adams*
The new Oklahoma Pleading Code has greatly altered a number
ofprocedures for civil actions. This Article is an in-depth examination
of the revisions of the service ofprocessprocedure in Oklahoma. Pro-
fessor Adams has written on the subject in order to provide insight into
the legislative intent of the Code.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Oklahoma Pleading Code went into effect on November 1,
1984.1 It is a major revision of pretrial procedure in Oklahoma courts
and follows up on such other recent major reforms in Oklahoma law as
the Oklahoma Evidence Code2 enacted in 1978, and the Oklahoma
Discovery Code3 enacted in 1982. The Oklahoma Pleading Code is
* Associate Professor of Law, The University of Tulsa College of Law. B.A., 1968, M.A.,
1970, University of California at Santa Barbara; M.B.A., 1972, University of California at Berke-
ley; J.D., 1976, University of California at Berkeley (Boalt Hall); member, Civil Procedure Com-
mittee, Oklahoma Bar Association, 1983-1984.
I am indebted to Dona K. Broyles for the fine work she did in assisting me in the drafting of
the text and commentary to the service of process provisions in the Oklahoma Pleading Code. I
am also grateful for the financial support generously provided by the Oklahoma Bar Foundation
for the preparation of the Oklahoma Pleading Code.
1. OKLAHOMA PLEADING CODE, 1984 Okla. Sess. Laws 588, 628 (West) (to be codified at 12
OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 2001-2027) [hereinafter cited as OKLa. PLEADING CODE].
2. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 2101-3103 (1981).
3. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 3201-3215 (Supp. 1984).
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based on rules 1 through 25 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 4
and replaces approximately 200 separate statutes5 dealing with pretrial
procedure. The Code substantially changes three principal areas of
Oklahoma procedure: service of process, joinder of claims and parties,
and pleading and motion practice.
This Article concerns the changes made to the procedures for ser-
vice of process. The provisions for service of process are now concen-
trated in section 2004 of title 12 of the Oklahoma Statutes.6 Not only
does the Code consolidate into a single statute many of the provisions
regulating service of process formerly scattered in numerous parts of
the Oklahoma Statutes,7 it also makes a number of changes designed to
simplify the procedures for accomplishing service.
In drafting section 2004, the Civil Procedure Committee' was con-
cerned with satisfying the requirements of due process. The due pro-
cess clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States
Constitution places the following two restrictions on service proce-
dures: 1) defendants must be given reasonable notice of the lawsuit
and an opportunity to be heard;9 and 2) defendants must have certain
minimum contacts with the state before its courts can exercise jurisdic-
tion over them.' 0
In addition to the restrictions imposed by due process, the statutes
regulating service of process can themselves impose certain restrictions.
For example, these statutes might attempt to prevent so-called "sewer
service"'" by providing that only sheriffs can serve process,' 2 or pro-
4. FED. R. CIv. P. 1-25.
5. See OKLA. PLEADING CODE, supra note 1, § 32, at 628.
6. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2004 (Supp. 1984).
7. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 151-190, 1701.01-1706.04; tit. 47, §§ 391-403; tit. 52,
§§ 501-503 (1981). Many of these statutes were repealed in 1984.
8. The members of the Civil Procedure Committee of the Oklahoma Bar Association during
1983 were David L. Field, Chairman; Ed Abel, Vice-Chairman; Charles W. Adams; Martin B.
Bernert; Hon. John L. Clifton; George D. Davis, Jr.; Roy J. Davis; George B. Fraser, Jr.; James
M. Hays, III; Hon. Robert H. Henry; Craig W. Hoster, Larry A. Tawwater; and Thomas A.
Wallace.
9. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). See also infra
notes 42-70 and accompanying text.
10. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). See also infra notes 165-
186 and accompanying text.
11. "Sewer service" has been defined as the fraudulent service of a summons and complaint
usually either by destroying it, by leaving it under a door or a mailbox, or by leaving it with a
person known not to be the defendant, and then executing an affidavit stating that the summons
was personally delivered to and left with the defendant.
Public Hearing, Abuses in the Service of Process, Before Louis J Lekowitz, Atiorne), General ofthe
State of New York 2 (1966) (statement of Frank Pannizzo, Asst. Atty. Gen'l of the State of New
[Vol. 20:137
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vide, through the state long arm statute, that jurisdiction over nonresi-
dent defendants is limited to claims arising out of their activities within
Oklahoma. 3 While these additional restrictions might further a legiti-
mate state interest, they are not required by the Constitution, and they
would also make it more difficult to accomplish effective service or
limit the power of Oklahoma state courts to decide cases brought
against out-of-state defendants. In general, the service of process pro-
visions in the Oklahoma Pleading Code are designed to promote flexi-
ble and economical use by the courts and practitioners, and to give
Oklahoma courts as much authority over out-of-state defendants as
possible. Hence, section 2004 of the Oklahoma Pleading Code at-
tempts to keep the restrictions on service of process, other than those
York), quotedin Comment, Abuse of Process: Sewer Service, 3 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 17, n.2
(1967). See generally Comment, Sewer Service and Confessed Judgments: New Protectionfor Low-
Income Consumers, 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 414 (1971); Comment, CivilProcedure-A Possible
Solution to the Problem of "Sewer Service" in Consumer Credit Actions, 51 N.C.L. REV. 1517
(1973).
12. Before 1976, a summons from an Oklahoma state court could be served by personal
delivery only by a sheriff or a person specially appointed by the sheriff or the court. See OKLA.
STAT. tit. 12, § 158 (1981) (repealed 1984). Service by mail was performed by the court clerk. Id
§ 153.1 (repealed 1984). Section 158.1 was enacted in 1976 to authorize service by private process
servers. Id § 158. 1. To protect against sewer service, supra note 11, or other fraudulent conduct,
§ 158.1 requires private process servers to be licensed by the presiding judge of the court and
provides for the filing of protests against process servers and revocation of licenses by the court.
Id
Until 1980, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorized service of process only by United
States marshals, deputy marshals, and persons specially appointed by the court. See FED. R. Civ.
P. 4, 28 U.S.C. app. at 395 (1976). Rule 4 was amended in 1980 to permit service of process by
persons allowed to serve process in state courts of general jurisdiction. In 1983, Rule 4 was again
amended to authorize service of process by any person over 18 years old who is not a party. See
generally Changes in Federal Summons Service Under Amended Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 96 F.R.D. 81 (1983) (text of amended FED. R. Civ. P. 4); Siegel, Practice Commentary
on Amendment of Federal Rule 4 (Eff. Feb. 26, 1983) With Special Statute of Limitations Precau-
tions, 96 F.R.D. 88 (1983) (discussion of changes in who may serve process); Recent Development,
Procedure-Service of Process-Proposed Amendment to Rule 4(c) Criticized, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q.
303 (criticizes amendment for eliminating judicial discretion by forcing them to adhere to state
laws and for reducing the reliability of service).
13. Several of Oklahoma's previous long arm statutes were expressly limited to claims arising
from the defendant's activities within the state. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 187(a), 1701.03
(1981) (repealed 1984); tit. 47, § 391 (1981) (repealed 1984); tit. 52, § 501 (1981) (repealed 1984).
Consequently, a foreign corporation that carried on extensive activities within Oklahoma would
not have been subject to suit on claims not arising from those activities. E.g., George v. Strick
Corp., 496 F.2d 10 (10th Cir. 1974) (jurisdiction over trailer manufacturer was denied because,
although the company sold trailers in Oklahoma, the accident giving rise to the cause of action
occurred in New Mexico; Oklahoma would only exercise in personam jurisdiction if the action
arose within Oklahoma); see generally Comment, In Personam Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corpora-
tions.- The "Arising From"Requirement, 30 OKLA. L. REV. 602, 614-16 (1977) (if a foreign corpora-
tion enjoys the benefits offered by Oklahoma, the foreign corporation should be subject to
Oklahoma's jurisdiction for certain causes of action that arise outside of Oklahoma).
3
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required by the Constitution, 14 to a minimum.
This Article will survey the service of process provisions that are
found in section 2004 of the Code. First, the form and contents of the
summons are briefly examined along with the procedures for having
summons issued by the clerk of the court or, where necessary, amended
by order of the court.'5 Second, the procedures for accomplishing ser-
vice of process on persons or entities within the State of Oklahoma are
discussed at length, beginning with an analysis of the requirements of
procedural due process as enunciated in a line of United States
Supreme Court cases. 6 The three main methods of accomplishing ser-
vice in Oklahoma--delivery, mail, and publication-are then surveyed,
including a description of procedures for serving individuals, corpora-
tions, unincorporated associations, and governmental entities as well as
the time limits for effecting service on these various entities. The sub-
ject of service of process outside of Oklahoma, addressed next, begins
with an historical analysis of the development of long arm statutes, and
extends to a discussion of the present due process limitations on the
power of state courts to assert jurisdiction over nonresidents by analyz-
ing recent federal cases.'" The procedures for serving defendants
outside of Oklahoma are also considered briefly. The procedures for
serving subpoenas are then examined,' 8 especially the major change
made by the Code extending the range of subpoenas for trial to the
state boundaries.19 The Article ends with an analysis of the proceduie
for recording lis pendens notices to give constructive notice of a lawsuit
involving real property.20
II. SERVICE OF THE SUMMONS
A. Preliminary Matters
Section 200321 designates the filing of the plaintiffs petition as the
point of commencement of a civil action. When the petition is filed, the
14. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 21-41 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 42-164 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 165-195 and accompanying text. These limitations are especially impor-
tant under the Code because section 2004(F) extends the jurisdiction of Oklahoma state courts
over nonresidents to the maximum extent permitted by the United States and Oklahoma Constitu-
tions. See infra notes 116-120 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 198-221 and accompanying text.
19. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2004(N) (Supp. 1984).
20. See infra notes 222-229 and accompanying text.
21. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2003 (Supp. 1984) provides: "Commencement of Action: A civil
action is commenced by filing a petition with the court."
[Vol. 20:137
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plaintiff's attorney should present to the court clerk one or more sum-
monses so that the clerk may sign them, affix the seal of the court, and
issue the summonses to the plaintiff's attorney.22 The form of the sum-
mons is prescribed by section 2004(B). 23 An example of a summons
that satisfies the requirements of section 2004(B) is provided in Form
124 in section 2027. In addition to the name of the court, the names of
the parties, and the name and address of the plaintiff's attorney, the
summons must also state when an answer is due and that a default
judgment will be taken if an answer is not timely served.
In contrast to prior Oklahoma law,25 the summons should not
specify a return date or an answer date. Under section 2012(A)26 the
answer is due twenty days after service of the summons if the summons
is personally delivered. If service is by mail, the answer is due twenty-
three days after mailing.' To enable the defendant's attorney to deter-
mine the date the response is due, the copy of the summons furnished
to the defendant must state the date of service if service is made by
personal delivery, or the date of mailing if service is by mail. Under
22. Id § 2004(A) provides:
A. SUMMONS: ISSUANCE. Upon filing of the petition the clerk shall forthwith is-
sue a summons and deliver it to the plaintiff or the plaintiff's attorney, who shall be
responsible for prompt service of the summons and a copy of the petition. Upon request
of the plaintiff separate or additional summons shall issue against any defendants.
23. Id § 2004(B) provides:
B. SUMMONS: FORM. The summons shall be signed by the clerk, be under the seal
of the court, contain the name of the court and the names of the parties, be directed to
the defendant, state the name and address of the plaintiff's attorney, if any, otherwise,
the plaintiff's address, and the time within which these rules require the defendant to
appear and defend, and shall notify him that in case of his failure to do so judgment by
default will be rendered against him for the relief demanded in the petition.
The person serving a summons shall state on the copy that is left with the party
served the date that service is made. Where service is to be made by mail, the person
mailing the summons shall state on the copy that is mailed to the party to be served the
date of mailing. These provisions are not jurisdictional, but if the failure to comply with
them prejudices the party served, the court may extend the time to answer.
A judgment by default shall not be different in kind from or exceed in amount that
prayed for in the demand for judgment with costs. Except as to a party against whom a
judgment is entered by default, every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the
party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such
relief in his pleadings.
Subsection B is based on FED. R. Civ. P. 4(b) and 54(c), although "[t]he last sentence of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(b) is deleted to provide consistency in the form of summons
required within and without the state." OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2004, Committee Comment to
Section 2004 (West Supp. 1984).
24. See infra Form 1, set out in the Appendix to this Article.
25. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 153 (1981) (repealed 1984). ("The summons must be directed to
the defendant and inform said defendant that he. . . must answer the petition on or before a date
stated therein.").
26. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2012(A) (Supp. 1984).
27. See OKLA STAT. tit. 12, §§ 2006(D), 2012(A) (Supp. 1984).
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prior Oklahoma law the plaintiff had to estimate the length of time
before service could be made in order to determine a return and answer
date.28 If the summons was not served before the return date, then an
alias summons had to be issued with a new return date.29 Section
2012(A) simplifies the service procedure by removing the need for the
plaintiff's attorney to verify that the summons and petition are served
before a return date, and eliminates the need for an alias summons.
Generally, errors in the form of the summons will be harmless and
can be corrected by amending the summons.30 For example, the court
in Great Plains Crop Management, Inc. v. Tryco Manufacturing Co.3
permitted the plaintiff to amend a summons that was defective because
it did not indicate the time the answer to the complaint was due.32
Some errors, though, cannot be corrected by amendment.33 Thus, the
court in Gianna Enterprises v. Miss World (Jersey) Ltd.34 did not allow
amendment of a summons which was neither signed by the court clerk
nor under the seal of the court.
An error in the form35 or method of service 36 may also be cor-
28. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 155 (1981) (repealed 1984).
29. See, e.g., Fleming v. Hall, 638 P.2d 1115, 1115 (Okla. 1981) (eight successive alias sum-
monses were issued before the defendant was served).
30. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2004(H) (Supp. 1984) provides:
H. AMENDMENT. At any time in its discretion and upon such terms as it deems
just, the court may allow any process or proof of service thereof to be amended, unless it
clearly appears that material prejudice would result to the substantial rights of the party
against whom the process issued.
31. 554 F. Supp. 1025 (D. Mont. 1983).
32. Id at 1028. The court in Great Plains first noted that the defendant had conceded that it
had not been prejudiced by the defect, and then applied FED. R. Civ. P. 4(h) which permits a
plaintiff to amend its summons. Id See also Newman v. Prior, 518 F.2d 97, 99 (4th Cir. 1975)
(amendment of summons was allowed where, instead of stating the name of the defendant, it
merely incorporated the caption of the complaint by reference); United States v. A.H. Fischer
Lumber Co., 162 F.2d 872, 874-75 (4th Cir. 1947) (misnomer of corporate defendant could be
corrected by amendment of summons).
33. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 2 comment d (1980) ("Some element of
formality in the notice is necessary, however. A person should not be bound to respond to a
rumor that he is being sued.").
34. 551 F. Supp. 1348, 1358-59 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). Whether the summons could be amended
was significant in the Glanna case because the defendant resided in Great Britain, making service
somewhat difficult.
35. See, e.g., Myers v. John Deere Ltd., 683 F.2d 270, 272 (8th Cir. 1982) (subsequent service
of summons with complaint cured earlier service of complaint without summons); Smith v. Boyer,
442 F. Supp. 62, 63-64 (W.D.N.Y. 1977) (dictum) (defendants were served with order to show
cause, complaint, and affidavit, but no summons; plaintiffs were allowed to "amend process" by
obtaining issuance of a new summons that could be served on the defendant).
36. See, e.g., Vorhees v. Fischer & Krecke, 697 F.2d 574, 576 (4th Cir. 1983) (service on a
West German defendaht failed to comply with service of process requirements set out by the
Hague Convention; plaintiff was given "a reasonable opportunity" to effect service); Jim Fox En-
ters., Inc. v. Air France, 664 F.2d 63, 64 (5th Cir. 1981) (service under FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e) and
6
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rected by the plaintiff's obtaining a new summons pursuant to section
2004(A) and re-serving the defendant. Thus, if a plaintiff, in attempt-
ing service on a defendant corporation, serves the wrong corporation,
he may have an additional summons issued so that he can then serve
the proper corporation. 37  In actions involving more than one defend-
ant, section 2004(A) permits the plaintiff to employ either a separate
summons for each defendant or multiple copies of a single joint sum-
mons naming all the defendants.38
The relief sought in the petition is limited by the last paragraph of
section 2004(B), which is identical to rule 54(c) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. 39 Thus, if a default judgment is obtained, the relief is
limited to the amount sought in the petition.4" If, however, the action is
contested, the parties can be awarded the relief to which they are enti-
tled, irrespective of the relief demanded in the pleadings.4
B. In-State Service
1. Procedural Due Process
The United States Supreme Court held in the landmark case of
under Texas' long-arm statute was insufficient; plaintiff permitted to re-serve under "purely fed-
eral means" in accord with FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(3)); Donnell v. National Guard Bureau, 568 F.
Supp. 93, 95 (D.D.C. 1983) (original service by certified mail was sent to the wrong address);
Kovalesky v. A.M.C. Associated Merchandising Corp., 551 F. Supp. 544, 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)
(service was made by throwing the papers in the defendant's lobby in front of a receptionist who
was not authorized to receive service; plaintiff permitted to re-serve the defendant corporation
because this could readily be done).
37. See, e.g., Hunt v. Broce Constr., Inc., 674 F.2d 834, 836 (10th Cir. 1982) ("[N]othing in
law or logic suggests that because a plaintiffs first service of process for a complaint naming a
nonexistent defendant reaches an existing entity, he cannot have issued an additional summons
directed to reach the party he should have served.").
38. See, e.g., Kramer v. Scientific Control Corp., 365 F. Supp. 780, 788 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (ser-
vice with a photographic copy of the summons was sufficient service on a co-defendant).
39. FED. R. Civ. P. 54(c) provides:
A judgment by default shall not be different in kind from or exceed in amount that
prayed for in the demand for judgment. Except as to a party against whom a judgment
is entered by default, every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in
whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in
his pleadings.
40. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Bartels Brewing Co., 26 F.R.D. 612, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), appeal
dismissed, 284 F.2d 855 (2d Cir. 1960) (because the complaint sought damages as well as an ac-
counting, a default judgment could be entered for the amount of the damages with an allowance
for interest thereon).
41. See, e.g., Equity Capital Co. v. Sponder, 414 F.2d 317, 319 n.1 (5th Cir. 1969) ("Except
for a default judgment, the prayer of the complaint is irrelevant."); Ring v. Spina, 148 F.2d 647,
653 (2d Cir. 1945) ("But Plaintiff is entitled to state his claims in detail if he chooses, and rely
upon the court to award him such judgment as his case deserves; and at trial he will not be bound
by his prayers").
7
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Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,42 that "[a]n elementary
and fundamental requirement of due process ... is notice reasonably
calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of
the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present
their objections."43 It is important to note that it is not necessary for a
court to assure itself that actual notice is received by a defendant in
order for the defendant to be bound by a decision of the court.44 For a
court to positively insure that a defendant actually received notice, the
judge would probably have to insist that the defendant personally ap-
pear in court and state that notice was had. This would impose an
onerous burden on litigants and courts, and defendants would be able
to avoid adverse court determinations simply by absenting themselves
from the court. Out of necessity, courts and legislatures have permitted
other means to establish the giving of notice.
One common method is personal delivery by a sheriff. Because
the sheriff is a public official, a certificate of service from a sheriff usu-
ally provides a court great assurance that a defendant received actual
notice.45 Nevertheless, the sheriff's certificate of service cannot give the
court absolute assurance that receipt of actual notice has occurred. The
sheriff may not have correctly determined the identity of the person to
whom he delivered the summons, or he may not have actually served
the summons at all.4" Due process, however, does not require that a
court have absolute assurance the defendant received actual notice of
an action in order to enter a binding default judgment against him, but
does require a procedure that is "reasonably calculated" under the" cir-
cumstances to give the defendant notice of the proceeding. 47 Requiring
a certificate of service from the sheriff stating that he has delivered the
42. 339 U.S. 306 (1950). Both in-state and out-of-state beneficiaries of a common trust fund
in the state of New York were given notice, by publication in a newspaper, of an action by the
trustee to settle its account. Id at 309-310. Service was sufficient only as to those beneficiaries
whose whereabouts could not be ascertained with due diligence. Id at 317. See also infra notes
53-60 and accompanying text.
43. Id at 314.
44. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 2 comment c (1980).
45. See Wilson v. Upton, 373 P.2d 229, 231 (Okla. 1962) (strong and convincing proof is
required to overcome a sheriff's return showing service); Recent Development, supra note 12, at
307-08.
46. See generally Tuerkheimer, Service ofProcess in New York City. A Proposed End to Un-
regulated Criminality, 72 COLUM. L. REv. 847 (1972) (discussion of the "breakdown" of the system
of service of process in New York City which was resulting in large numbers of default judg-
ments); Comment, Civil Procedure-A Possible Solution to the Problem of "Sewer Service" in Con.
sumer CreditActions, 51 N.C.L. REv. 1517, 1519 (1973) (sewer service is particularly prevalent in
consumer credit actions).
47. See, e.g., Call Carl, Inc. v. BP Oil Corp., 391 F. Supp. 367, 379 (D. Md. 1975), cert.
[Vol. 20:137
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summons and petition to the defendant as a precondition to entry of a
default judgment meets this standard.48  Depending on the circum-
stances, other methods of service, such as delivery by licensed process
servers,49 substituted service on an adult member of the defendant's
household,50 or an agent authorized to receive service of process,51 or
service by mail, publication, or posting in a public place may also com-
ply with due process, provided that these methods are reasonably cal-
culated to give the defendant notice of the action.52
Notice by publication was the form of notice scrutinized by the
United States Supreme Court in the Mullane case53. Mullane dealt with
a procedure for judicial settlement of accounts by a trustee of a com-
mon trust fund based on New York legislation authorizing the pooling
of smaller trust funds into common trust funds to enable banks to di-
versify portfolios and to achieve economies of scale in the administra-
tion of such funds.5 4 The legislation further provided a mechanism for
trustees to protect themselves from open-ended liability by periodically
obtaining a judicial settlement of accounts.55 Once the court approved
the administration of the trust funds for a particular period, the benefi-
ciaries were foreclosed from challenging it later.5 6 The New York leg-
islation authorized notice to the trust beneficiaries to be given by
publication in a newspaper designated by the court.5 The United
denied, 434 U.S. 923 (1977) (service was sufficient against a parent corporation when made on the
attorney for the subsidiary corporation).
48. See Wilson v. Upton, 373 P.2d 229 (Okla. 1962), in which the court, in determining a
motion to quash service of summons, stated:
[A] sheriff's return on a summons showing service, while not conclusive, is prima facie
evidence of its truthfulness, and strong and convincing proof is required to overcome it.
Another general rule is that the sheriff's recital of service cannot be contradicted or
impeached by the uncorroborated testimony of the party shown to have been served.
Id at 231. See also Couch v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 302 P.2d 117, 120 (Okla.
1956) (sheriff's return stating that service was made on a member of the defendant association was
prima facie evidence).
49. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 158.1 (Supp. 1984).
50. For a discussion of prior Oklahoma law on this type of substituted service, see infra note
87 and accompanying text.
51. See, e.g., National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311,315 (1964). Service was
sufficient against lessees of certain equipment when service was made on an individual designated
in the lease agreement as "the agent for the purpose of accepting service of any process within the
State of New York." Id at 313.
52. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
53. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
54. Id at 307.
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States Supreme Court held that due process required a form of notice
"such as one desirous of actually informing the absentee might reason-
ably adopt to accomplish it."58 The Court recognized that it was diffi-
cult for the trustee to keep track of the large numbers of beneficiaries of
the pooled trust funds and that it would be impractical for the common
trust fund legislation to require personal service on each individual
beneficiary. 9 However, as to those beneficiaries whose identities and
addresses could be ascertained by the trustee through reasonable effort,
due process mandated, at the least, notice by ordinary mail sent to the
addresses found in the trustee's records. 60
The constitutionality of notice by publication was analyzed by the
Oklahoma Supreme Court in the context of a quiet title action involv-
ing mineral leases in the leading case of Bomford v. Socony Mobil Oil
Co.61 The plaintiffs in Bomford challenged an earlier quiet title pro-
ceeding in which notice had been given by publication.62 The
Oklahoma Supreme Court questioned whether the notice by publica-
tion procedure followed in the earlier action actually complied with the
due process requirements announced in Mullane.63 The court found
that the procedure made it possible for a plaintiff to obtain a default
judgment in a quiet title action solely on the basis of conclusory decla-
rations without any factual showing of due diligence in attempting to
notify interested parties.' Following Mullane, the Bomford court held
that due process required a plaintiff to make a diligent effort to locate
absent defendants before resorting to notice by publication. Facts
showing that the plaintiff has made a diligent search to locate absent
58. Id at 315. The court continued:
The reasonableness and hence the constitutional validity of any chosen method may be
defended on the ground that it is in itself reasonably certain to inform those affected,
• ..or, where conditions do not reasonably permit such notice, that the form chosen is
not substantially less likely to bring home notice other than of the feasible and custom-
ary substitutes.
Id
59. Id at 316-317.
60. Id at 318. The court concluded:
As to known present beneficiaries of known place of residence, however, notice by
publication stands on a different footing. Exceptions in the name of necessity do not
sweep away the rule that, within the limits of practicability, notice must be such as is
reasonably calculated to reach interested parties. Where the names and post office ad-
dresses of those affected by a proceeding are at hand, the reasons disappear for resort to
means less likely than the mails to apprise them of its pendency.
Id
61. 440 P.2d 713 (Okla. 1968).
62. Id at 716.
63. Id at 717.
64. Id at 718.
[Vol. 20:137
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defendants must be proved to the court at a hearing, and the trial court
should not approve notice by publication unless it is satisfied that the
required diligence has been shown.65
Recently, the United States Supreme Court again dealt with the
requirements of due process in two separate cases. In Greene v. Lind-
sey,66 the Court relied on Mullane to hold that posting a summons on a
tenant's door in a forcible entry action was not adequate notice unless
the summons was also mailed to the tenant.67 In Mennonite Board of
Missions v. Adams, 6 the Court again followed Mullane in holding that
the fourteenth amendment required notice of a tax sale of real property
to be given either by personal service or by mail to mortgagees of the
property whose names and addresses could be readily found in the
county recorder's office.69
In summary, determining whether a method of notice satisfies due
process involves assessing the probable effectiveness of the method in
providing actual notice and balancing this against the feasibility of al-
ternative methods that may enhance the likelihood of imparting actual
notice to the defendant. If another method of service is likely to be
more effective and is practicable, due process requires its use, although
a defendant will be bound by a court's decision even if he did not re-
ceive actual notice of the proceeding as long as the method of notice
complied with the requirements of due process. 70
65. Id at 720. In order to avoid upsetting settled land titles, the Bomford court ruled that its
decision would be given prospective effect only. Id at 721.
66. 456 U.S. 444 (1982).
67. Id at 455. The court noted that "[in determining the constitutionality of a procedure
established by the State to provide notice in a particular class of cases, 'its effect must be judged in
the light of its practical application to the affairs of men as they are ordinarily conducted."' Id at
451 (quoting North Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman, 268 U.S. 276,283 (1925)). OKLA. STAT. tit. 12,
§ 1148.5A (1981), authorizes service in forcible entry and detainer actions by posting in conjunc-
tion with sending the summons by registered or certified mail if service by delivery cannot be
made on the tenant or a person over 15 years of age residing at the tenant's residence.
68. 103 S. Ct. 2706 (1983).
69. Id at 2712. See also Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956) (notice of con-
demnation proceeding published in a local newspaper was an inadequate means of informing a
landowner whose name was known to the city and was on the official records); Schroeder v. City
of N.Y., 371 U.S. 208 (1962) (publication in a newspaper and posted notices were inadequate to
apprise a property owner of condemnation proceedings when his name and address were readily
ascertainable from both deed records and tax rolls).
70. Dana P. v. State, 656 P.2d 253, 255 (Okla. 1982) (service by publication); Williams v.
Egan, 308 P.2d 273, 276-77 (Okla. 1957) (service by mail to last known address); Smith v. Kincaid,
249 F.2d 243, 245 (6th Cir. 1957) (substituted service on defendant's landlady). See also Insurance




Adams: Service of Process under the Oklahoma Pleading Code
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1984
TULSA LAW JOURN.AL [Vol. 20:137
2. Service by Delivery of the Summons
While due process establishes the minimal standards a method of
service must satisfy, the legislature may impose additional standards or
requirements. Section 2004(C)(1)71 of the Oklahoma Pleading Code
authorizes sheriffs, deputy sheriffs, and licensed process servers to serve
summonses and petitions by personal delivery. Limitations are placed
on the persons permitted to serve process in order to prevent sewer
service 72 or other fraud on the court. Moreover, while licensed process
servers may serve summonses and petitions, only sheriffs are author-
ized to serve writs of attachment and of execution. 73
Section 2004(D)74 requires the summons and petition to be served
71. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2004(C)(1) (Supp. 1984) provides:
C. By WHOM SERVED.
1. Process, other than a subpoena, if served in the manner provided in subsection
D of this section, shall be served by a sheriff or deputy sheriff, a person licensed to make
service of process in civil cases, or a person specially appointed for that purpose. When
process has been served and return thereof is filed in the office of the court clerk, a copy
of the return shall be sent by the court clerk to the plaintiff's attorney within three (3)
days after the return is filed. Process, other than a subpoena, shall not be served by a
party's attorney except as provided in paragraph 2 of this subsection. The court shall
freely make special appointments to serve all process, other than a subpoena, under this
paragraph.
Provisions for the licensing of process servers can be found in OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 158.1 (Supp.
1984).
72. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
73. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2004, Committee Comment to Section 2004 (West Supp.
1984); 10 Okla. Op. Att'y Gen. 34 (1977).
74. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2004(D) (Supp. 1984) provides:
D. SUMMONS AND PETITION: Person to be Served. The summons and petition
shall be served together. The plaintiff shall furnish the person making service with such
copies as are necessary. The failure to serve a copy of the petition with the summons is
not a ground for dismissal for insufficiency of service of process, but on motion of the
party served, the court may extend the time to answer or otherwise plead. Service shall
be made as follows:
1. Upon an individual other than an infant or an incompetent person, by deliver-
Ing a copy of the summons and of the petition to him personally or by leaving copies
thereof at his dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person then residing
therein who is fifteen (15) years of age or older or by delivering a copy of the summons
and of the petition to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of
process;
2. Upon an infant who is less than fifteen (15) years of age, by serving the sum-
mons and petition upon him personally and upon either of his parents or his guardian, or
if they cannot be found, then upon the person having the care or control of the infant or
with whom he lives; and upon an incompetent person by serving the summons and peti-
tion upon him personally and upon his guardian;
3. Upon a domestic or foreign corporation or upon a partnership or other unincor-
porated association which is subject to suit under a common name, by delivering a copy
of the summons and of the petition to an officer, a managing or general agent, or to any
other agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process and, if the
agent is one authorized by statute to receive service and the statute so requires, by also
mailing a copy to the defendant;
4. Upon the United States or an officer or agency thereof, by delivering a copy of
12
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together, and section 2004(B) requires the process server to write the
date of service on the copy of the summons that is served on the de-
fendant.75 If service is by mail, the date of mailing should be written
on the copy of the summons that is mailed to the defendant. Although
failure to satisfy these requirements will not be grounds for dismissal of
the action,76 the court may grant additional time for the defendant to
respond to the petition.77
Proper service by personal delivery normally entails handing the
summons and petition to the defendant.78 If the defendant refuses to
accept delivery of the summons and petition, however, the process
server may effect service by leaving them near the defendant.79 Thus,
service has been upheld where, after the defendant refused to accept
the summons and of the petition to an officer, agency, or employee designated by and in
the manner specified by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4; and
5. Upon a state, county, school district, public trust or municipal corporation or
other governmental organization thereof subject to suit, by delivering a copy of the sum-
mons and of the petition to the officer or individual designated by specific statute; how-
ever, if there is no statute, then upon the chief executive officer or a clerk, secretary, or
other official whose duty it is to maintain the official records of the organization.
75. See supra note 23.
76. The Oklahoma Supreme Court has held:
A mere defect in formal style or nomenclature will not invalidate service of process un-
less it actually resulted in failure to give notice, as can be discerned from the excerpts
from Mullane which demonstrate the inquiry is centered on what steps are necessary to
impart actual notice, and not formalistic ritual service of process.
Union Tex. Petroleum v. Corporation Comm'n, 651 P.2d 652, 658 (Okla. 1981), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 837 (1982). See also Young v. Seaway Pipeline, Inc., 576 P.2d 1144, 1147 (Okla. 1977) ("mere
irregularities" will not void defective service if the defendant is apprised of "the nature of the case,
the court in which it is filed, and his interest therein"). AccordOKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 154.2 (1981)
(repealed 1984) ("Defects in the form of the return of a summons do not constitute grounds for
quashing the summons or its service.").
77. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2004, Legislative Note to Section 2004 (West Supp.
1984):
Subsection B of Section 2004 was amended by the Senate Judiciary Committee to
provide that the person serving a summons shall state the date of service on the copy left
with the party served. Where service is by mail, the person mailing the summons shall
state the date of mailing on the copy mailed to the defendant. These changes in Section
2004(B) are not jurisdictional, and failure to comply with them will not invalidate the
service of process. If the defendant is prejudiced because the date of service did not
appear on the summons, the court may extend the time to answer. Specifying the date of
service or mailing on the face of the summons is intended to facilitate the defendant's
computation of the time to respond to the petition. An enlargement of time to respond
may be given for cause shown as provided in subsections B of Section 2006.
78. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1227 (5th ed. 1979); see also Clemmons v. State, 5 Okla.
Crim. 119, 121, 113 P. 238, 239 (1911) ("The word 'service' itself, as used with reference to sum-
monses, writs, subpoenas, notice and other legal processes, means the reading of the same to the
person to be served, or the delivery to such person of the original or a copy thereof.").
79. See, e.g., Novak v. World Bank, 703 F.2d 1305, 1310 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (dictum)
("When a person refuses to accept service, service may be effected by leaving the papers at a
location, such as on a table or on the floor, near that person." (citing Errion v. Connell, 236 F.2d
447, 457 (9th Cir. 1956); Heritage House Frame & Moulding Co. v. Boyce Highlands Furniture
13
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service of process, the service papers were pitched through a screendoor
of the defendant's apartment,80 placed nearby the defendant's manag-
ing agent,8 ' left on the seat of a vehicle that the defendant was standing
near,8 2 left in the door jamb of the front door of the defendant's
house,83 or left on the defendant's doorstep."
Section 2004(G)85 provides that, after properly serving the defend-
ant, the process server should then file a return of service with the court
within twenty days after the service. Failure to file a return of service,
Co., 88 F.R.D. 172, 174 (E.D.N.Y. 1980); 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1095, at 362 (1969)).
In some cases a process server may get carried away in attempting to serve an evasive defend-
ant and use tactics to effect service that may be considered harassment. See Bockian v. Esanu
Katsky Korins & Siger, 124 Misc. 2d 607, 610, 476 N.Y.S.2d 1009, 1011 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984)
(process server allegedly harassed defendant). Naturally an attorney should not condone or par-
ticipate in vexatious tactics to accomplish service, and an attorney who did so could be found
liable to the defendant for abuse of process or other intentional torts.
80. E.g., Errion v. Connell, 236 F.2d 447, 457 (9th Cir. 1956). The court did place emphasis
on testimony which, although contradicted, showed that the sheriff, when pitching the papers
through a hole in the screendoor, saw the defendant and spoke to her. Id
81. E.g., Heritage House Frame & Moulding Co. v. Boyce Highlands Furniture Co., 88
F.R.D. 172, 174 (E.D.N.Y. 1980). The court noted that in making personal service, the process
server "merely has to 'tender' the summons to the appropriate individual." Id Since the process
server had announced he had a summons and, upon the person's refusal to accept it, placed the
summons "nearby," service was sufficient. Id
82. E.g., Roth v. W.T. Cowan, Inc., 97 F. Supp. 675, 676-77 (E.D.N.Y. 1951). The court
implied that when the defendant refused to identify himself, the marshall had no choice but to
leave the summons on the seat of the defendant's cab. Id
83. E.g., Business & Professional Adjustment Co. v. Baker, 62 Or. App. 237, -, 659 P.2d
1025, 1027 (1983) (after defendant, who was behind the front door, told the sheriff "to go away,"
the sheriff was proper in announcing he had a summons and leaving it in the door).
84. E.g., Haney v. Olin Corp., 245 So. 2d 671, 673-74 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971). When no
one would open the door, the deputy read the summons in "a loud voice" and left it on the
doorstep. This was sufficient when the defendant was on the premises and could have received the
summons by opening the door upon request. Id See also International Controls Corp. v. Vesco,
593 F.2d 166, 176-78, 181-82 (2d Cir.), cert. deniea 442 U.S. 941 (1979) (chronicles the daring
service effected on Robert Vesco in the Bahamas); Trujillo v. Trujillo, 71 Cal. App. 2d 257,-, 162
P.2d 640, 641 (1945) (after defendant locked himself in a parked automobile and rolled up the
windows, process server left papers under the windshield wipers); Ex Parte Ball, 2 Cal. App. 2d
578, -, 38 P.2d 411 (1934) (process server tossed papers at defendant from 12 feet as defendant
was walking away); Martin v. Raffin, 21 N.Y.S. 1043 (1893) (defendant attempted to avoid service
by hiding under wife's petticoats).
85. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2004(G) (Supp. 1984) provides:
G. RETURN. The person serving the process shall make proof of service thereof to
the court promptly and in any event within the time during which the person served
must respond to the process. If service is made by a person other than a sheriffor deputy
sheriff, such person shall make affidavit thereof. If service was by mail, the person serv-
ing process shall show in his proof of service the date and place of mailing and attach a
copy of the return receipt or returned envelope, if and when received by him, showing
whether the mailing was accepted, refused, or otherwise returned. If the mailing was
refused, the return shall also make proof of any further service mailed pursuant to para-
graph 2 of subsection C of this section. Failure to make proof of service does not affect
the validity of the service.
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though, will not affect the validity of the service. Within three days of
the filing of the return by the process server, the court clerk should send
a copy of the return to the plaintiffs attorney in order that he can then
determine the response date.8 6
In addition to service by personal delivery, section 2004(D)(1) per-
mits substituted service on a defendant by leaving a copy of the sum-
mons and petition at the defendant's residence with a person who lives
there and is at least fifteen years of age. In contrast to prior Oklahoma
law,87 the person receiving the papers does not have to be a member of
the defendant's family; the recipient is required only to be a full-time
resident in the defendant's home. Thus, leaving service papers with the
defendant's landlady,88 a live-in maid,89 or a relative90 has been held to
be effective service, while leaving them with a janitor,91 ranch em-
ployee, 92 or part-time housekeeper93 has been held ineffective. Addi-
tionally, to constitute effective substituted service, a copy of the
summons and complaint must be left at the defendant's residence
rather than his place of business. 94
Substituted service is also allowed under section 2004(D)(1) upon
86. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2004(C)(1) (Supp. 1984).
87. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 159 (1981) (repealed 1984), which provided: "The service shall
be made by delivering a copy of the summons to the defendant personally or by leaving one at his
usual place of residence with some member of his family over fifteen years of age, at any time
before the return day."
88. See, e.g., Nowell v. Nowell, 384 F.2d 951, 952-53 (5th Cir.), (process left with apartment
complex manager who resided in a different building than the defendant), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
956 (1967); Smith v. Kincaid, 249 F.2d 243, 245 (6th Cir. 1957) (summons left with defendant's
landlady at an address where the defendant resided).
89. See, e.g., Barclays Bank v. Goldman, 517 F. Supp. 403, 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (affidavits
established that the maid resided with defendant, was an adult, spoke English, and exercised suffi-
cient discretion to deliver the papers); Lewis v. West Side Trust & Say. Bank, 286 Ill. App. 130,-,
2 N.E.2d 976, 978 (1936) ("A maidservant is a member of the family.").
90. See, e.g., M. Lowenstein & Sons, Inc. v. Austin, 430 F. Supp. 844, 845 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)
(service on 21-year-old daughter visiting home from college was valid). Cf. Williams v. Capital
Transit Co., 215 F.2d 487, 489-91 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (service on wife from whom defendant was
separated was held invalid).
91. See, e.g., Zuckerman v. McCulley, 7 F.R.D. 739, 742 (E.D. Mo. 1948) (attempted service
by leaving summons with a janitor who did not reside in defendant's home was not effective).
92. See, e.g., Geldermann & Co., Inc. v. Dussault, 384 F. Supp. 566, 569 (N.D. Ill. 1974)
(service attempted on defendant's foreman who did not reside with the defendant).
93. See, e.g., Franklin Am., Inc. v. Franklin Cast Prods., Inc., 94 F.R.D. 645, 647 (E.D. Mich.
1982) (part-time housekeeper did not reside in defendant's house).
94. See, e.g., Betlyon v. Shy, 573 F. Supp. 1402, 1405 (D. Del. 1983) (summons and complaint
served on defendant's supervisor while defendant was vacationing in another state); Thompson v.
Kerr, 555 F. Supp. 1090, 1093 (S.D. Ohio 1982) (service of process at bank's corporate offices was
insufficient to effect service on members of bank's board of directors); Tart v. Hudgins, 58 F.R.D.
116, 117 (M.D.N.C. 1972) (service on wife at defendant's place of business was invalid).
15
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an agent authorized by appointment or by law95 to accept service of
process on behalf of the defendant. Generally courts have required an
actual appointment for the specific purpose of receiving process in or-
der to validate substituted service on an agent.96 The United States
Supreme Court has upheld service on such an agent even when ap-
pointed pursuant to a form contract, as long as the service agent
promptly notified the defendant of the service. 97 While an attorney is
the agent of his client for many purposes, substituted service on an at-
torney will not be effective unless the client has specifically appointed
him as his agent for service of process. 98 Once process has been prop-
drly served on the defendant, section 2005(B) 99 permits subsequent pa-
pers to be served by mailing them to the defendant's attorney.
Section 2004(D)(2) governs service on persons less than fifteen
years of age and on incompetents. 10 Like others, these persons must
95. Examples of agents authorized by law to receive service of process on behalf of specific
types of defendants are found at OKLA. STAT. tit. 2, § 3-82(f) (1981) (Secretary of State Board of
Agriculture is agent for nonresident commercial aerial applicators of pesticides); id tit. 36,
§ 1425(I)(2)(b) (Supp. 1984) (State Insurance Commissioner is agent for licensed nonresident in-
surance agents); id. tit. 59, § 1504(c) (1981) (Administrator of Consumer Affairs is agent for pawn-
brokers); id. tit. 69, § 312 (Secretary of State is agent for nonresident contractors doing business
with the State Highway Commission); and id. tit. 71, § 413(h) (Securities Administrator is agent
for persons violating the Oklahoma Securities Act).
96. E.g., Lamont v. Haig, 539 F. Supp. 552, 557 (D.S.D. 1982) (secretaries were not agents for
service of process); Gipson v. Township of Bass River, 82 F.R.D. 122, 125 (D.N.J. 1979) (township
clerk was not authorized agent of members of a Zoning Board of Adjustment).
97. National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 316-18 (1964) (agent was desig-
nated to receive service in an equipment lease agreement). But see Budget Mktg., Inc. v. Toback,
88 F.R.D. 705, 707 (S.D. Iowa 1981), in which service was agreed to be made on the plaintiff
corporation for actions against the defendant, a franchisee of the plaintiff corporation. The court
held the service "invalid ab initio" because the agent authorized by appointment was the plaintiff,
and, thus, the agent had a pecuniary interest in the subject matter of the litigation. These factors,
the court concluded, distinguished the case from National Equip. Rental. Id at 707-08.
98. See, e.g., Ranson v. Brennan, 437 F.2d 513, 518-19 (5th Cir.) (attorney upon whom ser-
vice was made had never been appointed for that purpose; he was merely the former attorney of
the decedent in an action against the executrix), cer. denied, 403 U.S. 904 (1971); Miree v. United
States, 490 F. Supp. 768, 775 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (in action against a county, service on county's
attorney was invalid); In re Four Seasons Sec. Law Litig., 63 F.R.D. 115, 122 (W.D. Okla. 1974)
(mailing of copies of complaint to counsel of newly-added defendants was improper service). But
see Durbin Paper Stock Co. v. Hossain, 97 F.R.D. 639, 640 (S.D. Fla. 1982) (service on attorney
who was defendant's business agent was valid).
99. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2005(B) (Supp. 1984).
100. The Oklahoma Pleading Code presently makes no explicit provisions for service on in-
fants who are fifteen years old or older. Nevertheless, the Code should not be interpreted to
immunize these infants from service of process in civil actions because such an interpretation
would be absurd. If possible, a statutory construction leading to an absurdity should be avoided.
See Grand River Dam Auth. v. State, 645 P.2d 1011, 1018-19 (Okla. 1982); AMF Tubescope v.
Hatchel, 547 P.2d 374,379 (Okla. 1976). Accordingly, § 2004(D)(1) should be construed to govern
service on individuals other than those infants and incompetents whose service is governed by
§ 2004(D)(2). Thus, infants who are fifteen years of age or older may be served by any of the
methods provided in § 2004(D)(1) or by mail, while infants who are less than fifteen years of age
16
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themselves be served with process in order to be bound by a court's
determination.' 0 ' In addition, though, service must be made on an in-
fant's parents or guardian, and on an incompetent's guardian."2
Service on corporations, partnerships, and other unincorporated
associations by delivery of a copy of the summons and petition is regu-
lated by section 2004(D)(3). These entities can act only through au-
thorized agents and can only be served through service on their
authorized agents. Section 2004(D)(3), which is identical to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(3), provides for service on one of these
entities by delivery of a copy of the summons and petition to an officer,
a managing or general agent, or an agent authorized by appointment or
by law to accept service of process on behalf of the entity. Federal
courts have generally construed Federal Rule 4(d)(3) liberally and have
not restricted the employees of organizations who may receive service
as officers or managing or general agents to a narrow class of persons
with official titles.0 3 To be effective, service must be made on a person
who is "so integrated with the organization that he will know what to
do with the papers" and "who stands in such a position as to render it
fair, reasonable and just to imply the authority" to accept service of
process.' 4 As a result, delivery of papers to a receptionist generally
should be served in accordance with § 2004(D)(2). This interpretation conforms to the intent of
the Civil Procedure Committee of the Oklahoma Bar Association in drafting the provisions relat-
ing to service on infants and to former Oklahoma law. 4ccord OKL.A. STAT. tit. 12, § 169 (1981)
(repealed 1984) ("[I]f the minor be more than fourteen years of age, service on him alone will be
sufficient.").
101. See Frost v. Blockwood, 408 P.2d 300, 305 (Okla. 1965) (service on infant's guardian
alone was not effective).
102. See Covey v. Town of Somers, 351 U.S. 141, 146 (1956) ("Notice to a person known to be
an incompetent who is without the protection of a guardian does not measure up to [the] require-
ment [of due process]."); Dale v. Hahn, 486 F.2d 76, 78-79 (2d Cir. 1973) (service on incompetent
alone did not give adequate notice and violated procedural due process), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 826
(1974).
103. See, e.g., Gottlieb v. Sandia Am. Corp., 452 F.2d 510 (3d Cir.), cert. denied 404 U.S. 938
(1971), in which the court, in discussing which persons could receive service on a corporation,
held:
The determination whether an individual is "a managing or general agent" depends
on a factual analysis of that person's authority within the organization. . . . One occu-
pying this position typically will perform duties which are "sufficiently necessary" to the
corporation's operations .... He should be a "responsible party in charge of any sub-
stantial phase" of the corporation's activity .... In brief, it is reasonable to expect that
such an agent will have broad executive responsibilities and that his relationship will
reflect a degree of continuity. . . . Authority to act as.agent sporadically or in a single
transaction ordinarily does not satisfy this provision of the Rule.
Id at 513 [citations omitted].
104. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. S/S "Hellenic Challenger", 88 F.R.D. 545, 547-48 (S.D.N.Y.
1980) (service by delivery to claims adjuster upheld) (quoting Top Form Mills, Inc. v. Sociedad
Nationale Industria Appicazioni Viscosa, 428 F. Supp. 1237, 1251 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)). Cf. Barclays
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will not be sufficient, even if the receptionist later hands the papers to a
corporate officer.' 05
Instead of attempting to locate an officer, or managing or general
agent of a corporation, the corporation's registered agent should be the
most convenient entity to serve. In addition to being more convenient,
service on a registered agent will usually be a more reliable method of
serving a corporation because the often difficult issues as to who may
accept service as a managing or general agent of the corporation would
be avoided. Article IX, section 43 of the Oklahoma Constitution re-
quires every foreign corporation that is licensed to do business in
Oklahoma to designate an agent to receive service of process,0 6 and
section 1.17 of title 18 of the Oklahoma Statutes10 7 requires that every
corporation have a registered agent for service of process. If a corpora-
tion does not appoint a registered agent, service of process may be
Bank of N.Y. v. Goldman, 517 F. Supp. 403, 407-08, 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (service on the maid of
an officer and controlling shareholder of the defendant corporation was effective as to the individ-
ual, but not as to the corporation). See also Jim Fox Enters., Inc. v. Air France, 664 F.2d 63, 64-65
(5th Cir. 1981) (service on airline ticket agent); Gottlieb v. Sandia Am. Corp., 452 F.2d 510, 513-
15 (3d Cir.) (personal service on majority shareholder who was not shown to be a managing or
general agent was not binding on the corporation), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 938 (1971).
105. See, e.g., Free State Receivables v. Claims Processing Corp., 76 F.R.D. 85, 87 (D. Md.
1977) (service may have been sufficient if the marshal had waited in the office while the reception-
ist delivered the summons); see also Kovalesky v. A.M.C. Associated Merchandising Corp., 551 F.
Supp. 544, 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (service papers thrown in front of receptionist in corporation's
lobby). But see Union Asbestos & Rubber Co. v. Evans Prods. Co., 328 F.2d 949, 952-53 (7th Cir.
1964) (service on secretary of local sales manager was valid where notice was communicated to the
corporation's home office).
106. OKLA. CoNsT. art. IX, § 43 provides:
Every foreign corporation shall, before being licensed to do business in the State,
designate an agent residing in the State; and service of summons or legal notice may be
had on such designated agent and such other agents as now are or may hereafter be
provided for by law. Suit may be maintained against a foreign corporation in the county
where an agent of such corporation may be found, or in the county of the residence of
plaintiff, or in the county where the cause of action may arise.
See generally vliet, The Oklahoma Business Corporation Act II. A Survey (Concluded), 3 OKLA. L.
Rnv. 400, 414-20 (1950) (venue and service of process actions against foreign corporations).
107. OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, § 1.17 (1981), provides in part:
a. Every corporation shall have and continuously maintain in this state a regis-
tered agent, on whom service of summons may be had. In the case of a domestic corpo-
ration, such agent may be either an individual, resident of this state, whose business
office is identical with the registered office, or a domestic corporation, having a business
office identical with the registered office, and in the case of a foreign or domesticated
corporation, such registered agent shall be the Secretary of State. A foreign or domesti-
cated corporation may in addition designate as a service agent an individual, resident of
the capital city or of the county of the principal place of business of the corporation in
Oklahoma, or a domestic corporation, having a business office in the capital city identi-
cal with the registered office. Provided that if such additional registered agent is desig-
nated, service of process shall be on such agent and not the Secretary of State.
b. Such registered agent shall be an agent of such corporation upon whom may be
served any process, notice, or demand required or permitted under the laws of this state
to be served upon a corporation.
18
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made on the Secretary of State."°8 If the- Secretary of State is served,
within three days of service, the Secretary must send copies of the sum-
mons and petition to the last known address of the corporation by reg-
istered or certified mail with return receipt requested. 10 9
Although service on a partnership may be made under section
2004(D)(3) by serving a general agent such as a single general partner,
to maximize the plaintiffs recovery, it is usually desirable to serve as
many general partners as possible. Although sections 150 and 215 of
title 54 of the Oklahoma Statutes" 0 provide that general partners are
jointly liable for the debts of a general or limited partnership,"' title
12, section 178 of the Oklahoma Statutes" 12 limits the property out of
which a judgment may be satisfied to partnership property plus the sep-
arate property of the partners who have been served."
3
Service on governmental entities is provided for in section
2004(D)(4) and (5). State and municipal organizations must be served
in accordance with the provisions of any specific statutes regulating
their service.'" In the absence of such a specific statute, service may be
accomplished by serving either the chief executive officer of the govern-
mental organization, or a clerk, secretary or other official whose duties
include maintaining the official records of the organization. Service on
the United States or a federal agency or employee is made in the same
way as in federal courts: in the manner specified by Federal Rule of
108. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 170.10 (Supp. 1984), for the procedure for making service on
the Secretary of State.
109. Id § 170.10(c). See also ABC Drilling Co. v. Hughes Group, 609 P.2d 763, 768 (Okla.
1980) (due process requires mailing notice of the action to the defendant foreign corporation in
addition to service on the Secretary of State); Rose v. K.K. Masutoku Toy Factory Co., 597 F.2d
215, 219-20 (10th Cir. 1979). See generally Comment, Substituted Service of Process on Foreign
Corporations in Oklahoma: Notice and Due Process, 12 TULSA L.J. 181 (1976) (analysis of the
constitutionality of substituted service of process on foreign corporations). Special rules govern
service of process on insurance companies. Insurance companies in Oklahoma are served in the
same way as other corporations; all other companies can be served only by serving the Insurance
Commissioner of the State of Oklahoma. OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, § 621 (1981).
110. OKLA. STAT. tit. 54, §§ 150, 215 (1981).
111. See, e.g., Fidelity Bank, N.A. v. Garland, 463 F. Supp. 37, 39 (W.D. Okla. 1978) (when
all individual partners are joined as parties defendant, it is not necessary to join the partnership
itself when the partnership is in the process of dissolution); In re Fowler, 407 F. Supp. 799, 806
(W.D. Okla. 1975).
112. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 178 (1981).
113. See Southard v. Oil Equip. Corp., 296 P.2d 780, 784 (Okla. 1956) ("[T]he individual
property of the member or members served or who appeared and defended in the action against
the partnership, thereby waiving service, may be reached for the purpose of satisfying [the judg-
ment] in the event that the partnership property is insufficient."); Taylor v. Quinnett, 109 Okla.
241, 243, 235 P. 214, 216 (1925).
114. Such statutes include OKLA. STAT. tit. 11, § 22-103 (Supp. 1984) (service on municipali-
ties), and OKLA. STAT. tit. 19, § 5 (1981) (service on counties).
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Civil Procedure 4(d)(4) and (5). 115
3. Service by Mail
Section 2004(C)(2) 1 6 authorizes service by mail as a simple, eco-
nomical alternative to service of process by personal delivery. Service
by mail has generally been available in Oklahoma state courts since
1968 with the enactment of section 153.1 of title 12 of the Oklahoma
Statutes' 7 and, in particular categories of actions, for an even longer
115. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(4) and (5) provide
(d) Summons and Complaint: Person to be Served. The summons and complaint
shall be served together. The plaintiffshall furnish the person making service with such
copies as are necessary. Service shall be made as follows:
(4) Upon the United States, by delivering a copy of the summons and of the com-
plaint to the United States attorney for the district in which the action is brought or to an
assistant United States attorney or clerical employee designated by the United States
attorney in a writing filed with the clerk of the court and by sending a copy of the sum-
mons and of the complaint by registered or certified mail to the Attorney General of the
United States at Washington, District of Columbia, and in any action attacking the va-
lidity of an order of an officer or agency of the United States not made a party, by also
sending a copy of the summons and of the complaint by registered or certified mail to
such officer or agency.
(5) Upon an officer or agency of the United States, by serving the United States
and by sending a copy of the summons and of the complaint by registered mail or certi-
fied mail to such officer or agency. If the agency is a corporation, the copy shall be
delivered as provided in paragraph (3) of this rule.
116. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2004(C)(2) (Supp. 1984) provides:
2. A summons and petition may be served by mail by the plaintiff's attorney, or
any person authorized to serve process pursuant to paragraph 1 of this subsection upon a
defendant of any class referred to in paragraph 1, 3, or 5 of subsection D of this section.
Service by mail may be accomplished by mailing a copy of the summons and petition by
certified mail, return receipt requested and delivery restricted to the addressee. Service
pursuant to this paragraph shall not be the basis for the entry of a default or a judgment
by default unless the record contains a return receipt showing acceptance by the defend-
ant or a returned envelope showing refusal of the process by the defendant. In the case
of an entity described in paragraph 3 of subsection D of this section, acceptance or re-
fusal by any officer or by any employee of the registered office or principal place of
business who is authorized to or who regularly receives certified mail shall constitute
acceptance or refusal by the party addressed. In the case of a state municipal corpora-
tion, or other governmental organization thereof subject to suit, acceptance or refusal by
an employee of the office of the officials specified in paragraph 5 of subsection D of this
section who is authorized to or who regularly receives certified mail shall constitute ac-
ceptance or refusal by the party addressed. If delivery of the process is refused, upon the
receipt of notice of such refusal and at least ten (10) days before applying for entry of
default, the person serving the process shall mail to the defendant by first-class mail a
copy of the summons and petition and a notice that despite such refusal the case will
proceed and that judgment by default will be rendered against him unless he appears to
defend the suit. Any such default or judgment by default shall be set aside upon motion
of the defendant if the defendant demonstrates to the court that the return receipt was
signed or delivery was refused by an unauthorized person. Such motion shall be filed
within one (1) year after the defendant has notice of the default or judgment by default
but in no event more than two (2) years after the judgment.
117. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 153.1 (1981) (repealed 1984).
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period." 8 Experience has shown that service by mail is normally the
cheapest method to serve process" 19 and that its availability has not
resulted in large numbers of invalid default judgments.120 The United
States Supreme Court held in Hess v. Pawloski12 1 that service by mail
on nonresident motorists complied with due process, 122 and nearly all
states now permit service by mail on nonresident motorists. 23  Re-
cently, the United States Supreme Court has held that due process re-
quires service by mail to be used in conjunction with service by
publication and posting in cases where a defendant's address is
known.' 24 Accordingly, the constitutionality of service by mail is well
established.
Under the Oklahoma Pleading Code service by mail is effected by
mailing a copy of the summons and petition to the defendant by certi-
fied mail with return receipt requested and delivery restricted to the
addressee.' 25 The date of mailing should be noted on the copy of the
summons sent to the defendant, and the defendant's response will be
due twenty-three days later.' 26 In contrast to prior Oklahoma law,'
27
court clerks will not be involved in serving process by mail. Generally
the plaintiffs attorney will make service by mail, although the persons
authorized to make service of process by delivery (sheriffs, deputy sher-
iffs, licensed process servers, and persons specially appointed by the
court) are additionally authorized to serve process by mail. 28 Restric-
tions are placed on the persons authorized to serve process by mail in
118. For a listing of a number of statutes authorizing service by mail in Oklahoma, see Com-
ment, Constitutional Law: The Validity of Service of Process by Mail When There Is No Return
Receot: The Outer Limits of Due Process, 25 OKLA. L. REV. 566, 566 nn.4 & 5 (1972).
119. See id at 566.
120. This conclusion is inferred from the dearth of reported decisions invalidating default
judgments following service by mail. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 153.1 (West Supp. 1984)
(repealed 1984).
121. 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
122. Id at 356. The court placed great emphasis on the public interest of the state in protect-
ing its citizens in automobile accidents. As a result, a nonresident motorist "impliedly consented"
to proceedings growing out of "accidents or collisions on a highway." Id
123. See Jox, Non-Resident Motorists Service of Process Acts, 33 F.R.D. 151, 153 n.5 (1963).
124. See Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 103 S. Ct. 2706 (1983); Greene v. Lindsey, 456
U.S. 444 (1982). See also infra notes 152-159 and accompanying text for a discussion of service by
publication.
125. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2004(C)(2) (Supp. 1984).
126. Id § 2004(B), 2012(A).
127. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 153.1 (1981) (repealed 1984). The court clerk delivered the sum-
mons to be served by the sheriff to the sheriff and would mail those summonses to be served by
mail.
128. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2004(C)(2) (Supp. 1984).
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order to prevent sewer service. 129
The post office will furnish the person serving process by mail with
a receipt at the time of mailing.1 30 If the defendant to be served is an
individual, delivery should be restricted to the addressee, so that the
process papers will be delivered only to the addressee or an agent spe-
cifically authorized in writing by the addressee to receive his mail.1
31
This restricted delivery is available only if the addressee is an
individual. 132
If the defendant to be served is an entity other than an individual,
the summons and petition should be mailed to that entity and may be
received at the registered office, principal place of business, or govern-
mental office by any officer or employee who is authorized to or regu-
larly receives certified mail for the entity. 33 To facilitate delivery to
the proper person within an organization, the plaintiffs attorney may
wish to address the summons and petition to that person's attention.
Once service by mail is effectuated on the entity, the members of the
organization will be responsible for ensuring that the summons and pe-
tition are delivered to the appropriate persons in the organization.1
34
After delivery to the defendant, the Postal Service will route a re-
turn receipt signed by the addressee to the person serving process by
129. See supra note 11. Cf. Proposed Okla. Pleading Code § 2004(C)(2), in 54 OKLA. B.J.
2120, 2122 (1983), with OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2004(C)(2). The original version of Section
2004(C)(2) provided that service by mail could be made by the plaintiff as well as by the plaintiffs
attorney and by the persons authorized to make service by personal delivery. See Proposed
Oklahoma Pleading Code, 54 OKLA. B.J. 2113, 2122, 2127 (1983). During a discussion of the
Proposed Oklahoma Pleading Code at the Oklahoma Judicial Conference on November 3, 1983,
the Honorable Leamon Freeman, District Judge, Oklahoma County, and a number of other
judges, objected to allowing plaintiffs to serve process by mail or otherwise. They argued that
vexatious plaintiffs might fraudulently represent to the court that service by mail was made in
order to obtain default judgments, which they could then use to harass innocent defendants by
creating invalid judgment liens and initiating garnishment proceedings. The members of the Civil
Procedure Committee of the Oklahoma Bar Association responded to the objections of the judges
by removing plaintiffs from the list of persons who are authorized to make service of process by
mail. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2004(C)(2) (Supp. 1984). Since attorneys are officers of the court,
see OKLA. STAT. tit. 5, §§ 2-3 (1981), the danger of their making fraudulent representations to a
court in connection with service of process is much less than the danger that interested parties
might abuse the procedures for service of process.
130. U.S. POSTAL SERV., DOMESTIC MAIL MANUAL. 912.1 (1979). "No record is kept at the
office at which certified mail is mailed. It will be dispatched and handled in transit as ordinary
mail. No insurance coverage is provided." Id
131. See id 933.1. Restricted delivery service is "available only for articles addressed to natu-
ral persons specified by name." Id
132. Id
133. O A. STAT. tit. 12, § 2004(C)(2) (Supp. 1984).
134. See, e.g., Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. S/S "Hellenic Challenger", 88 F.R.D. 545, 547-48
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (delivery to claims adjuster).
[Vol. 20:137
22
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 20 [1984], Iss. 2, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol20/iss2/1
SER VICE OF PROCESS
mail,'35 which should then be filed with the court. 13 6
If the summons and petition are presented by the Postal Service to
a defendant, and he refuses to accept them, as occasionally happens,
the service may nevertheless be valid. Presumably a defendant who
refuses the certified mail is well aware of its contents, and there is no
reason to permit him to evade service in this manner. 137  Section
2004(C)(2) authorizes the person serving the process to send a copy of
the summons and petition by ordinary mail, along with a notice to the
defendant, stating that despite his refusal of service, the case against
him will proceed and a default judgment against him will be rendered
unless he appears and defends the lawsuit. This notice must be sent to
the defendant at least ten days before the plaintiff applies for entry of
the default.
A default judgment should not be entered unless delivery of the
summons and petition was either accepted or refused by the defend-
ant.138 If the postal carrier cannot locate the defendant, he will leave a
Delivery Notice or Receipt at the defendant's address and bring the
summons and petition back to the post office, where they will be held
for the defendant. If they are not picked up within five days, a second
notice, a Delivery Reminder or Receipt, will be sent to the defendant.
After fifteen days the summons and petition will be returned to the
sender if the defendant does not call for them and the sender does not
request redelivery.'39 Failure of a restricted addressee to respond to
notice of attempted delivery is not the same as refusal of delivery, and
accordingly, a default judgment should not be rendered if the summons
and petition are returned as unclaimed.' 4 ° Moreover, a default judg-
ment should not be rendered if the defendant cannot be found at the
135. U.S. POSTAL SERV., supra note 130, at 932.1.
136. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2004(G) (Supp. 1984).
137. See generally Note, Service of Process by Mail, 74 MICH. L. REv. 381, 388 (1975) ("A
defendant who has refused service by mail has acted with extreme culpability in frustrating the
plaintiff's legitimate attempt to obtain a signed return receipt; denial ofjurisdiction would render
service by mail a meaningless gesture, voidable with impunity by any well-informed defendant.");
Comment, supra note 118, at 568-69 ("If the defendant chooses to flout the notice and refuses to
accept it, he will not be permitted to say in the next breath that he has not been served.").
138. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2004(C)(2) (Supp. 1984) provides in part: "Service [by mail] shall
not be the basis for the entry of a default or a judgment by default unless the record contains a
return receipt showing acceptance by the defendant or a return envelope showing refusal of the
process by the defendant."
139. U.S. POSTAL SERV., supra note 130, at 912.5.
140. Snyder v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 548 P.2d 218, 220 (Okla. 1976) (service agent had
no duty to aid service).
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address,14' the return receipt is signed by an improper person,' 42 or if
the signature is not legible. 143 If a judgment is void because of im-
proper service, it may be set aside at any time.44 In addition, a defend-
ant may have a default judgment set aside on the grounds that a return
receipt was signed or delivery was refused by an unauthorized person.
The motion must be filed within one year after the defendant had no-
tice of the judgment and within two years after it was rendered. 145
Finally, while service by mail is permitted under the Oklahoma
Pleading Code against most defendants, it is not authorized against in-
fants or incompetents. 46 In addition, in actions against the United
States and federal agencies and officers, service by mail may be used
only to the extent permitted by Federal Rule 4(d)(4) and (5). 14 7
4. Other Methods of Service
The Oklahoma Pleading Code authorizes other methods of service
in addition to personal delivery and mail. Under section 2012, objec-
tions to service are waived if the defendant files an appearance as pro-
141. Since the service will probably be sent by restricted delivery, only the defendant or an
authorized agent can accept service. See supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text. It logically
follows that if the defendant was not found at the address and, therefore, could not sign for the
delivery, service would be invalid.
142. OKLA. STAr. tit. 12, § 2004(C)(2) (Supp. 1984) (defendant must show that the return re-
ceipt was accepted or refused by "an authorized person").
143. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2004(C)(2) (Supp. 1984); see also Siegel, Practice Commentaries on
FRCP Rule 4, 28 U.S.C.A. 18, 36 (West Supp. 1984) in which the author states:
The plaintiff does have to be at least a bit wary. He must be satisfied that the signa-
ture on the returned acknowledgment form is the defendant's. It might be illegible. The
plaintiff can help protect himself from that prospect by including on the form a line,
under the signature line, for the defendant to print his name.
144. SeeTarnmie v. Rodriguez, 570 P.2d 332 (Okla. 1977); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1038 (1981).
145. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2004(C)(2) (Supp. 1984) provides in part:
Any such default or judgment by default shall be set aside upon motion of the defendant
if the defendant demonstrates to the court that the return receipt was signed or delivery
was refused by an unauthorized person. Such motion shall be filed within one (1) year
after the defendant has notice of default or judgment by default but in no event more
than two (2) years after the judgment.
If a judgment is set aside under this provision, OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 774 (1981), protects the
title of purchasers of real property that has been sold in satisfaction of a judgment by permitting
the defendant to recover from the judgment creditors the money for which the real property was
sold plus interest from the date of sale. Section 774 protects the title only of third party purchasers
at execution sales, though, and has been held not to protect the title of a judgment creditor who
purchases at an execution sale or a grantee of a judgment creditor. Morgan v. City of Ardmore,
182 Okla. 542, 544,78 P.2d 785, 788 (1938), overruled on other grounds, City of Bristow v. Groom,
194 Okla. 384, 386-87, 151 P.2d 936, 939 (1944).
146. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2004(C)(2) (Supp. 1984), which restricts the use of service by
mail to those defendants described in § 2004(D)(1), (3), and (5). Service on infants and incompe-
tents is dealt with in § 2004(D)(2).
147. See supra note 115 for the text of FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(4) and (5).
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vided in section 2012(A) or files an answer or pre-answer motion that
does not raise an objection to service.1 48 Also, service is effected if the
defendant acknowledges receipt of a copy of the summons and petition
on the back of the summons.
49
If a plaintiff demonstrates that service cannot be accomplished by
delivery or mail, the court may order alternative methods of service as
long as they comply with due process by being reasonably calculated to
give the defendant actual notice of the action. 150 Depending on the
circumstances, such alternative methods of service made pursuant to
court order might include posting, service by ordinary mail, substituted
service on a friend, relative, business associate, employer, or insurer of
the defendant, or some combination of these methods.'
When service cannot be made by any other method, service by
publication is available under section 2004(C)(3).152 Although service
148. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2012(A), (E), (F)(1) (Supp. 1984).
149. Id § 2004(C)(4) provides: "An acknowledgment on the back of the summons or the
voluntary appearance of a defendant is equivalent to service." This provision is identical to for-
mer OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 162 (1981) (repealed 1984).
150. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2004(C)(5) (Supp. 1984) provides:
If service cannot be made by personal delivery or by mail, a defendant of any class
referred to in paragraph I or 3 of subsection D of this section may be served as provided
by court order in any manner which is reasonably calculated to give him actual notice of
the proceedings and an opportunity to be heard.
151. See generally Kirst, Nebraska's Modern Service of Process Statute, 63 NEB. L. REv. 1, 10-
12 (1983) (alternative methods of service of process under Nebraska law are explained); Annot., 17
A.L.R.4th 918 (1982) (service of process on liability insurer of the defendant).
152. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2004(C)(3) (Supp. 1984) provides:
a. Service of summons upon a named defendant may be made by publication when it is
stated in the petition, verified by the plaintiff or his attorney, or in a separate affida-
vit by the plaintiff or his attorney filed with the court, that with due diligence service
cannot be made upon the defendant by any other method.
b. Service of summons upon the unknown successors of a named defendant, a named
decedent, or a dissolved partnership, corporation, or other association, may be made
by publication when it is stated in a petition, verified by the plaintiff or his attorney,
or in a separate affidavit by the plaintiff or his attorney filed with the court, that the
person who verified the petition or the affiant does not know and with due diligence
cannot ascertain the following:
(I) whether a person named as defendant is living or dead, and, if dead, the names
or whereabouts of his successors, if any,
(2) the names or whereabouts of the unknown successors, if any, of a named
decedent,
(3) whether a partnership, corporation, or other association named as a defendant
continues to have legal existence or not; or the names or whereabouts of its
officers or successors,
(4) whether any person designated in a record as a trustee continues to be the
trustee; or the names or whereabouts of the successors of the trustee, or
(5) the names or whereabouts of the owners or holders of special assessment or
improvement bonds, or any other bonds, sewer warrants or tax bills.
c. Service pursuant to this subsection shall be made by publication of a notice, signed
by the court clerk, one (I) day a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper
authorized by law to publish legal notices which is published in the county where the
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by publication is unlikely to impart actual notice to a defendant, its use
petition is filed. If no newspaper authorized by law to publish legal notices is pub-
lished in such county, the notice shall be published in some such newspaper of gen-
eral circulation which is published in an adjoining county. All named parties and
their unknown successors who may be served by publication may be included in one
notice. The notice shall state the court in which the petition is filed and the names of
the parties, and shall designate the parties whose unknown successors are being
served. The notice shall also state that the named defendants and their unknown
successors have been sued and must answer the petition on or before a time to be
stated (which shall not be less than forty-one (41) days from the date of the first
publication), or judgment, the nature of which shall be stated, will be rendered ac-
cordingly. If jurisdiction of the court is based on property, any real property subject
to the jurisdiction of the court and any property or debts to be attached or garnished
must be described in the notice.
(1) When the recovery of money is sought, it is not necessary for the publication
notice to state the separate items involved, but the total amount that is claimed
must be stated. When interest is claimed, it is not necessary to state the rate of
interest, the date from which interest is claimed, or that interest is claimed until
the obligation is paid.(2) It is not necessary for the publication notice to state that the judgment will
include recovery of costs in order for a judgment following the publication no-
tice to include costs of suit.
(3) In an action to quiet title to real property, it is not necessary for the publication
notice to state the nature of the claim or interest of either party, and in describ-
ing the nature of the judgment that will be rendered should the defendant fail to
answer, it is sufficient to state that a decree quieting plaintiffs title to the de-
scribed property will be entered. It is not necessary to state that a decree for-
ever barring the defendant from asserting any interest in or to the property is
sought or will be entered if the defendant does not answer.
(4) In an action to foreclose a mortgage, it is sufficient that the publication notice
state that if the defendant does not answer, the defendant's interest in the prop-
erty will be foreclosed. It is not necessary to state that a judgment forever bar-
ring the defendant from all right, title, interest, estate, property and equity of
redemption in or to said property or any part thereof is requested or will be
entered if the defendant does not answer.
d. Service by publication is complete when made in the manner and for the time pre-
scribed in subparagraph c of paragraph 3 of subsection C of this section. Service by
publication shall be proved by the affidavit of any person having knowledge of the
publication. No default judgment may be entered on such service until proof of
service by publication is filed with and approved by the court.
e. Before entry of a default judgment or order against a party who has been served
solely by publication under this subsection, the court shall conduct an inquiry to
determine whether the plaintiff, or someone acting in his behalf, made a distinct and
meaningful search of all reasonably available sources to ascertain the whereabouts of
any named parties who have been served solely by publication under this subsection.Before entry of a default judgment or order against the unknown successors of a
named defendant, a named decedent, or a dissolved partnership, corporation or as-
sociation, the court shall conduct an inquiry to ascertain whether the requirements
described in subparagraph b or paragraph 3 of subsection C of this section have been
satisfied.
fA party against whom a default judgment or order has been rendered, without other
service than by publication in a newspaper, may, at any time within three (3) years
after the date of the judgment or order, have the judgment or order opened and be let
in to defend. Before the judgment or order is opened, the applicant shal notify the
adverse party of his intention to make such an application and shall file a full answerto the petition, pay all costs if the court requires them to be paid, and satisfy the court
by affidavit or other evidence that during the pendency of the action he had no actual
notice thereof in time to appear in court and make his defense. The title to any
property which is the subject of and which passes to a purchaser in good faith by or
26
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has been approved by the courts when no other method of service
could be used to provide actual notice.1 53 Section 2004(C)(3), which
addresses service by publication, 15 4 is derived from a number of prior
Oklahoma provisions. 155 Service by publication is initiated by filing
with the court a statement that, despite due diligence, service cannot be
made by any other method. The statement must be made by the plain-
tiff or his attorney in either a verified petition or a separate affidavit. A
notice signed by the court clerk is then published one day a week for
three consecutive weeks in a newspaper authorized to publish legal no-
tices in the county where the action is filed or in an adjoining county. 156
The notice must set forth the name of the court, the names of the par-
ties, the nature of the relief sought, and the time when the answer to the
petition is due. The time to answer must be not less than forty-one
days after the date of the first publication. Service by publication is
completed when the notice has been published as described above, and
must be proved by the affidavit of any person having knowledge of the
publication. 57
Before entering a default judgment against a defendant who has
in consequence of the judgment or order to be opened shall not be affected by any
proceedings under this subparagraph. Nor shall proceedings under this subpara-
graph affect the title of any property sold before judgment under an attachment. The
adverse party, on the hearing of an application to open a judgment or other as pro-
vided by this subparagraph, shall be allowed to present evidence to show that during
the pendency of the action the applicant had notice thereof in time to appear in court
and make his defense.
g. The term "successors" includes all heirs, executors, administrators, devisees, trustees,
and assigns, immediate and remote, of a named individual, partnership, corporation,
or association.
h. Service outside of the state does not give the court in personam jurisdiction over a
defendant who is not subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state or who has
not, either in person or through an agent, submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the
courts of this state.
153. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315-17 (1950); for a discus-
sion of Mullane, see supra notes 42-43 and 53-60 and accompanying text. See also Bomford v.
Socony Mobil Oil Co., 440 P.2d 713 (Okla. 1968), an action by successors in interest of an Indian
allottee against the successor of a tax deed grantee, whose title to fee had been quieted to him in a
prior quiet title action, to cancel mineral deeds of record and to quiet title to the mineral estate.
Service was by publication. Id at 716. The court held that "before a plaintiff may resort to publi-
cation process he must make a diligent search of all available sources at hand to ascertain the
whereabouts or post-office addresses of his adversaries." Id at 720 (emphasis in the original).
This diligence had to be proved at a pre-judgment hearing. Id
154. See supra note 152.
155. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 170.6, 170.7, 173, 174, 176 (1981) (repealed 1984), and OKLA.
DIsT. CT. R. 16.
156. For discussions of the conditions a newspaper must satisfy in order to be authorized to
publish legal notices, see In re Piedmont Publishing Co., 628 P.2d 1163, 1164-65 (Okla. 1981);
Ruble v. Redden, 517 P.2d 1124, 1126-27 (Okla. 1973).
157. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2004(C)(3)(d) (Supp. 1984).
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been served by publication, the court must make sure that the require-
ments of due process have been satisfied.15 8 Section 2004(C)(3)(e) re-
quires the court to conduct an inquiry to determine whether the
plaintiff has made a diligent search to locate the defendant in an effort
to provide him with actual notice of the action. A defendant who has
been served by publication is given additional protection by section
2004(C)(3)(f), which provides for the setting aside of a default judg-
ment at any time within three years after it was rendered. To have the
judgment set aside, the defendant must file an answer to the plaintiffs
petition and prove that he did not receive actual notice of the action
before the judgment was entered.' 5 9
5. Time Limits for Effecting Service
Section 2004(A) places the responsibility for prompt service of the
summons and petition on the plaintiff and his attorney. The sanction
for failure to make prompt service is dismissal of the action without
prejudice.160 Section 2004(I) provides for dismissal of an action with-
out prejudice upon motion by the defendant or on the court's own initi-
ative if service is not made within 120 days of the filing of the petition,
unless the plaintiff can show good cause why service was not made or
that the defendant is in a foreign country.' 6' A plaintiff nearing the
158. See Bomford v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., 440 P.2d 713, 719 (Okla. 1968). For the facts in
Bomford see supra note 153. The court held:
When constitutionally protected rights are at stake, the court's determination of the va-
lidity of its process must be made, at the latest, when the judgment is rendered and
before it is sought to be enforced or vacated. Due process is violated by the mere act of
exercising judicial power upon process not reasonably calculated to apprise the defend-
ant of the pendency of the action.
id
159. See, e.g., Tate v. Robertson, 472 P.2d 905, 908 (Okla. 1970) (answer need not allege that
the plaintiff has no valid cause of action, but only that there was no justification for the court's
judgment or order); Gann v. Gann, 459 P.2d 605, 608 (Okla. 1969) (default judgment upheld
because defendant failed to allege that he had no actual notice or knowledge of the pendency of
the action).
160. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2004(I) (Supp. 1984) provides:
SUMMONS: TIME LIMIT FOR SERVICE. If service of process is not made upon a
defendant within one hundred twenty (120) days after the filing of the petition and the
plaintiff cannot show good cause why such service was not made within that period, the
action shall be dismissed as to that defendant without prejudice upon the court's own
initiative with notice to the plaintiff or upon motion. If service of process is not made
upon a defendant within one hundred eighty (180) days after the filing of the petition,
the action shall be deemed to have been dismissed without prejudice as to that defend-
ant. This subsection shall not apply to service in a foreign country.
161. Subsection I is based on FED. R. Civ. P. 40). OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2004, Commit-
tee Comment to Section 2004 (West Supp. 1984). If the action is dismissed under this subsection,
the action may be refiled within one (1) year pursuant to OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 100 (1981). Id
See infra note 163 for text of § 100.
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120-day time limil can, and should, request an enlargement of time for
making service pursuant to section 2006(B). 162 Failure to make service
within 180 days will result in a mandatory dismissal of the action with-
out prejudice unless the defendant is in a foreign country. Section
2004(I) should be read in conjunction with title 12, section 100 of the
Oklahoma Statutes,'63 which overrides intervening statutes of limita-
tions and gives a plaintiff one year to file a second action after a dismis-
sal other than on the merits. A plaintiff may take advantage of section
100 only once, however, and thus will not be permitted to bring more
than one additional action after the statute of limitations has
expired. 164
C. Out-of-State Service
1. Constitutional Limits of Territorial Jurisdiction
At one time it was believed that the fourteenth amendment re-
quired that "[t]he authority of every tribunal is necessarily restricted by
the territorial limits of the State in which it is established."'' 65 While
the courts of a state could exercise authority over persons and property
within the state's territorial limits, state courts could not exercise au-
thority outside of the state's territorial limits. 16 6 As modem means of
162. See Sanders v. Marshall, 100 F.R.D. 480, 483 (W.D. Pa. 1984) (construing FED. R. Civ.
P. 40) from which § 2004(1) was derived); Coleman v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 100 F.R.D. 476,
477-78 (N.D. Inl. 1984).
163. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 100 (1981), provides:
If any action is commenced within due time, and a judgment thereon for the plaintiff is
reversed, or if the plaintiff fail in such action otherwise than upon the merits, the plaintiff
.may commence a new action within one year after the reversal or failure although
the time limit for commencing the action shall have expired before the new action is
filed.
For cases construing this section, see C & C Tile Co. v. Independent School Dist. No. 7, 503 P.2d
554, 558-59 (Okla. 1972) (section applies to dismissal for lack of venue); Holder v. Rising Bros.,
Inc., 619 P.2d 1278, 1279 (Okla. Ct. App. 1980) (legislature intended to extend limitations statute
regardless of whether any time remained before the running of the limitations) (released for publi-
cation by order of Ct. App.); Citizens' Action for Safe Energy, Inc. v. Okla. Water Resources Bd.,
598 P.2d 271, 273 (Okla. Ct. App. 1979) (section has no application to mandatory special proceed-
ings under the Administrative Procedures Act) (released for publication by order of Ct. App.).
164. See, e.g., Fishencord v. Peterson, 185 Okla. 542, 543, 94 P.2d 910, 911 (1939) (third peti-
tion dismissed when demurrer to first petition was sustained on ground of misjoinder of parties,
and a demurrer to a second petition was also sustained when that petition set up the same cause of
action as in the previous petition).
165. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1877). For a discussion of the historical trend of
territorial jurisdiction since Pennoyer, see Seidelson, Recasting World-Wide Volkswagen as a
Source of Longer Jurisdictional Reach, 19 TULSA L.J. 1, 5-10 (1983).
166. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722. The Supreme Court explained:
The several States are of equal dignity and authority, and the independence of one im-
plies the exclusion of power from all others. And so it is laid down by jurists, as an
elementary principle, that the laws of one State have no operation outside of its territory,
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transportation and communication stimulated greater interaction be-
tween persons in different parts of the United States, this restrictive
view of territorial jurisdiction proved increasingly inadequate, particu-
larly as to certain types of defendants. 167 Accordingly, the legal fiction
of consent to jurisdiction was relied on for the assertion of jurisdiction
over nonresident motorists and foreign corporations. 168
In 1945, the United States Supreme Court adopted a new philoso-
phy of territorial jurisdiction and greatly expanded the authority of
state courts over nonresidents in International Shoe Co. v. Washing-
ton.169 The Court held that due process required only that a nonresi-
dent defendant have certain minimum contacts with a state to subject
him to the jurisdiction of the courts of the state.' 70 Whether a defend-
ant's activities in a state permit a court to exercise jurisdiction over him
depends upon if the defendant's activities in the state were continuous
and systematic, and if these activities gave rise to the plaintiff's
claim.1 7 ' Conversely, if the defendant's activities in the state are iso-
lated or sporadic, the courts of the state may not assert jurisdiction over
him on claims that do not arise out of those activities;' 72 however, if a
defendant's activities in a state are sufficiently continuous and system-
except so far as is allowed by comity; and that no tribunal established by it can extend its
process beyond that territory so as to subject either persons or property to its decisions.
Id
167. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). The court noted
that jurisdiction based on the ability of the sheriff to take the defendant and bring him before the
court (a writ of capias ad respondendum) was essentially obsolete because of the use of service of
process. Id See also Seidelson, supra note 165, at 6-9 (the writ of capias had become an
"anachronism").
168. See, e.g., OKLA. CONST. art. IX, § 43 (foreign corporations must designate agent for ser-
vice of process before being licensed to do business in state); OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, §§ 391-403
(1981) (§§ 391-394 amended 1984 and repealed 1984; §§ 395, 397-403 repealed 1984; § 396 re-
pealed 1957) (nonresident motorists consent to appointment of Secretary of State as agent for
service of process); id tit. 18, § 1.204a (1971) (repealed 1980) (service authorized on Secretary of
State if foreign corporation has no agent for service of process).
169. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
170. Id at 316.
[Diue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in per-
sonam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum
contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice."
Id (citing Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
171. Id at 320.
172. See, e.g., Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 104 S. Ct. 1868, 1872-73
(1984). The plaintiff brought suit in Texas against a Columbian corporation on a claim arising out
of a helicopter crash in Peru. The defendant did not have a place of business in Texas and was
never licensed to do business there. The contacts consisted of sending its executive officer to
Houston to negotiate; accepting checks drawn on a bank in Houston; purchasing helicopters and
equipment from a business in Texas; and sending personnel to Texas for training. Id at 1873.
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atic, the courts of the state may constitutionally assert jurisdiction over
the defendant as to claims not arising from the defendant's activities." 3
Moreover, even if a defendant's activities within the state are only iso-
lated or sporadic, the courts of the state may exercise jurisdiction over
him as to claims arising from those activities. 17 4  Finally, due process
allows the courts of a state to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant
who has never performed any activities within the state if his activities
outside of the state caused injury within the state.' 75
Whether a defendant may be subjected to the jurisdiction of a
state court hinges on the relationship between the defendant, the state,
and the claims being asserted by the plaintiff. 176 The unilateral activity
of others who claim a relationship with a nonresident defendant who
has only isolated contacts with a state is not sufficient to subject him to
the jurisdiction of its courts; 17 7 what is needed is some act by which the
defendant purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting
activities within the state.178 Even if it is foreseeable that a defendant's
activities might cause injury in a state, the state's courts will not assert
jurisdiction over him unless the defendant's activities in and connec-
tions with the state "are such that he should reasonably anticipate be-
ing haled into court there."'179
173. See, e.g., Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 445-47 (1952). Gen-
eral manager of a corporation with mines in the Philippines conducted the affairs of the corpora-
tion during WWII from Ohio. This activity established sufficient minimum contacts. Id at 448.
The plaintiff stockholder was, as a result, permitted to bring, in Ohio, an action for dividends even
though the cause of action did not arise in Ohio or relate to the corporation's activities there. Id
at 438, 448.
174. See, ag., Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 1473, 1478-79 (1984) (New Hamp-
shire courts had jurisdiction over a defendant engaged in sale of magazines in New Hampshire
containing allegedly libelous material); McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223
(1957) (California courts had jurisdiction over insurer who issued renewal of life insurance policy
to California resident).
175. See, e.g., Calder v. Jones, 104 S. Ct. 1482, 1486-87 (1984) (article written in Florida in-
jured plaintiff's reputation in California); Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.,
22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961) (safety valve manufactured in Ohio caused explosion of
water heater in Illinois).
176. See, e.g., Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977) (Court required all assertions of
state court jurisdiction to be determined in accordance with the minimum contacts analysis of
International Shoe).
177. E.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). A trust agreement was executed in
Delaware by a trust company incorporated in Delaware, and a settlor domiciled in Pennsylvania.
An action was subsequently brought in Florida to determine certain rights to part of the corpus of
the trust. The contact with Florida relied upon to bring tla action there was that the settlor had
become domiciled in Florida, and the trustee remitted trust income to her there. This was an
insufficient basis for jurisdiction. Id at 252-53.
178. Id. at 253.
179. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) (defendant auto-
mobile retailer in New York was not subject to suit in Oklahoma, even though it was foreseeable
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Two recent cases, which illustrate these principles, involved suits
by recent law school graduates who, after failing examinations, sued
their examiners. In Burstein v. State Bar,180 a Louisiana resident sued
the State Bar of California after she failed the bar examination. For
tactical reasons,' 8 ' she sued in Louisiana instead of California and al-
leged that Louisiana courts had jurisdiction over the California Bar be-
cause: (1) approximately fifty-three members of the California Bar
lived in Louisiana; (2) eighty-nine Louisiana law students took the Cal-
ifornia bar examination; (3) by applying to the California Bar, plaintiff
had allegedly entered into a contract with the California Bar in Louisi-
ana; and (4) plaintiff suffered harm in Louisiana.18 2 The court, in dis-
missing the action, held that the California Bar did not have the
minimum contacts sufficient for Louisiana courts to exercise jurisdic-
tion over it because there was no action by the California Bar by which
it had purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activi-
ties in Louisiana, and the only contacts with California were initiated
by Louisiana residents.8 3
A somewhat different conclusion was reached by the court in
Hahn v. Vermont Law Schoo,' 8 4 a case in which a Massachusetts resi-
dent sued a law school and a law professor who had given the plaintiff
an "F" in a secured transactions course. The court upheld jurisdiction
in Massachusetts over the law school, but not over the professor. The
court found that the law school had purposefully availed itself of the
privilege of conducting activities in Massachusetts by sending applica-
tion information and an acceptance letter to the plaintiff in Massachu-
setts and by engaging in a continuous effort, over a number of years, to
that an automobile sold in New York might cause injury in Oklahoma, because the retailer would
not reasonably anticipate being sued there). See also Seidelson, supra note 165, for a discussion of
the jurisdictional limits resulting from World- Wide Volkswagen.
180. 693 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1982).
181. These tactical reasons were most probably that the plaintiff felt that she would receive
more favorable treatment from a Louisiana court than from a California court of which the judge
would himself or herself be a member of the California Bar.
182. Burstein, 693 F.2d at 518.
183. Id at 520-523. The court expounded further:
The [California] Bar does not go into Louisiana to seek new members; all its contacts
with Louisiana are initiated by Louisianans. This bears more of a resemblance to....
Hanson (Delaware trustee merely received instructions from settlor who had moved to
Florida; Florida has no personal jurisdiction over trustee) and Kulko (father, a New
York resident with custody, permitted daughter to live with mother in California; Cali-
fornia had no personal jurisdiction over father) than in those [sic] McGee (solicitation of
insurance contract; personal jurisdiction over insurer) or International Shoe (salesmen
soliciting orders; personal jurisdiction over seller).
Id at 522.
184. 698 F.2d 48 (1st Cir. 1983).
[Vol. 20:137
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recruit students from Massachusetts.18 5 The law professor, however,
was not subject to the jurisdiction of a Massachusetts court because he
had only taught the course in Vermont and had not engaged in any
activities in Massachusetts.
18 6
2. Oklahoma Statutes Relating to Territorial Jurisdiction
The constitutional limits of a state court's territorial jurisdiction
are especially important under the Oklahoma Pleading Code because
section 2004(F), 87 the Code's long arm statute, permits Oklahoma state
courts to exercise jurisdiction on any basis that is consistent with the
United States and Oklahoma Constitutions. Oklahoma's prior'88 long
arm statutes, replaced by section 2004(F), did not extend to the full
reach permitted by due process because they allowed jurisdiction to be
asserted over out-of-state defendants only as to claims arising from the
defendants' activities that either occurred in Oklahoma or caused inju-
ries in Oklahoma." 9 On the other hand, where the plaintiffs claim
arose out of the defendant's contacts with Oklahoma, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court construed section 1701.03 of title 12 of the Oklahoma
statutes' 90 to extend to the limits of due process permitted under the
United States Constitution. 191
185. Id at 50. The court placed particular emphasis on the fact that the law school's activities
in Massachusettes were not isolated, that the Massachusetts students consistently comprised close
to ten percent of the school's first-year class, that at least five Massachusetts colleges were visited
for the purpose of recruitment, and that a number of the school's advertisements were placed in
Boston newspapers. Id at 52.
186. Id
187. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2004(F) (Supp. 1984) provides: "A court of this state may exercise
jurisdiction on any basis consistent with the Constitution of this state and the Constitution of the
United States."
188. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 187(a) and (b), 1701.3 (1981) (repealed 1984); id tit. 47, § 391.
189. See, e.g., Luckett v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 618 F.2d 1373, 1386 (10th Cir. 1980) (dictum)
(tort action could not be maintained in Oklahoma against a corporation whose only contact with
Oklahoma was certain contract negotiations which took place in the State); George v. Strick
Corp., 496 F.2d 10, 12 (10th Cir. 1974) (Pennsylvania trailer manufacturer selling tractors in
Oklahoma was not subject to suit in Oklahoma where trailer was purchased in New Mexico and
injury occurred in New Mexico); Roberts v. Jack Richards Aircraft Co., 536 P.2d 353, 355 (Okla.
1975) (airlines conducting advertising and having telephone listing in Oklahoma City were not
subject to suit in Oklahoma, when acts which allegedly gave rise to their liability occurred outside
Oklahoma); see also Comment, In Personam Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations: The 'Arising
From" Requirement, 30 OKLA. L. REv. 602, 614-16 (1977) (criticizes this limitation in the long arm
statutes).
190. OKA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1701.03 (1981) (repealed 1984).
191. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 290 (1980) (citing Fields v.
Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 555 P.2d 48 (Okla. 1976); Carmack v. Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co.,
536 P.2d 897 (Okla. 1975); Hines v. Clendenning, 465 P.2d 460 (Okla. 1970)); Vemco Plating, Inc.
v. Denver Fire Clay Co., 496 P.2d 117, 119 (Okla. 1972) (Colorado corporation was subject to suit
in Oklahoma on claim arising out of its furnishing materials for a furnace in Oklahoma).
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Section 2004(F) extends the reach of Oklahoma's long arm statutes
by permitting the exercise of jurisdiction over claims not arising out of
a nonresident defendant's activities in Oklahoma, where the defend-
ant's activities in Oklahoma are continuous and systematic. By ex-
tending the reach of jurisdiction, the Code should simplify the analysis
used to determine whether a nonresident defendant is subject to suit in
Oklahoma. Formerly, both the requirements of due process and the
detailed requirements of Oklahoma's long arm statutes had to be taken
into account.192 Under section 2004(F), though, only the requirements
of due process will need to be considered.
The procedures for accomplishing service on defendants who are
outside of Oklahoma are found in section 2004(E) t93 and were taken
from title 12, sections 1701.01 to 1702.04 of the Oklahoma Statutes, 94
which were part of the Uniform Interstate and International Procedure
192. Luckett v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 618 F.2d 1373, 1385-87 (10th Cir. 1980); see supra notes
187-89 and accompanying text.
193. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2004(E) (Supp. 1984) provides:
SUMMONS: TERRITORIAL LIMITS OF EFFECTIVE SERVICE.
I. Service of the summons and petition may be made anywhere within this state in
the manner provided by subsections C and D of this section.
2. When the exercise of jurisdiction is authorized by subsection F of this section,
service of the summons and petition may be made outside this state:
a. by personal delivery in the manner prescribed for service within this state,
b. in the manner prescribed by the law of the place in which the service is
made for service in that place in an action in any of its courts of general jurisdiction,
c. in the manner prescribed by paragraph 2 of subsection C of this section,
d. as directed by the foreign authority in response to a letter rogatory,
e. in the manner prescribed by paragraph 3 of subsection C of this section
only when permitted by subparagraphs a and b of paragraph 3 of subsection C of
this section, or
f. as directed by the court.
3. Proof of service outside this state may be made in the manner prescribed by
subsection G of this section, the order pursuant to which the service is made, or the law
of the place in which the service is made for proof of service in an action in any of its
courts of general jurisdiction.
4. Service outside this state may be made by an individual permitted to make ser-
vice of process under the law of this state or under the law of the place in which the
service is made or who is designated to make service by a court of this state.
5. When subsection D of this section requires that in order to effect service one or
more designated individuals be served, service outside this state under this section must
be made upon the designated individual or individuals.
6. a. A court of this state may order service upon any person who is domiciled or
can be found within this state of any document issued in connection with a proceed-
ing in a tribunal outside this state. The order may be made upon application of any
interested person or in response to a letter rogatory issued by a tribunal outside this
state and shall direct the manner of service.
b. Service in connection with a proceeding in a tribunal outside this state may
be made within this state without an order of court.
c. Service under this paragraph does not, of itself, require the recognition or
enforcement of an order, judgment, or decree rendered outside this state.
194. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 1701.01-1702.04 (1981) (repealed 1984).
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Act. If section 2004(F) permits an Oklahoma court to assert jurisdic-
tion over an out-of-state defendant, section 2004(E) authorizes service
in the manner permitted by the law of the place where the defendant is
located, or in any manner (including delivery, mail, publication, or as
ordered by the court) permitted under the Oklahoma Pleading Code.
If the defendant is in a foreign country, service may have to be made in
accordance with a letter rogatory from the foreign government or by
some other procedure authorized by international law.195 Thus, the
procedures for service on out-of-state defendants will now be quite
flexible.
Although service on out-of-state defendants has been designed to
be more simple and effective, a nonresident defendant will not be sub-
ject to suit in a state solely on the basis of the activities of other persons
in the state. What is required to permit the exercise of jurisdiction over
a nonresident defendant is activity on the part of the nonresident that is
of such a nature and magnitude that the nonresident could reasonably
expect to be subject to suit there. Rooted in traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice, the test for territorial jurisdiction is not
"simply mechanical or quantitative." '196 Nevertheless, a fairly worka-
ble standard for deciding when due process will allow a court to exer-
cise jurisdiction over a nonresident emerges from the many cases
dealing with this subject that have been decided by the Supreme Court
and other courts. 19 7
III. SUBPOENAS
Subpoenas are mandates issued under the authority of a court to
compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of documents at
195. See Vorhees v. Fischer & Krecke, 697 F.2d 574, 575-76 (4th Cir. 1983) (service on West
German defendant under the Hague Convention); DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654
F.2d 280, 287-90 (3d Cir.) (discussion of Hague convention), cert. deniea 454 U.S. 1085 (1981);
Harris v. Browning-Ferris Indus. Chem. Servs., 100 F.R.D. 775, 776-77 (M.D. La. 1984) (docu-
ment must be translated and direct mail must not be used in serving a West German defendant
under the Hague Convention); Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial
Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters (Hague Convention), opened for signing Nov. 15,
1965, in Service.Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents, 20 U.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S. 6638, 658
U.N.T.S. 163 (entered into force for the United States Feb. 10, 1969). Horlick, A Practical Guide
to Service of United States Process Abroad, 14 INT'L LAW. 637 (1980), is a useful reference. For an
additional discussion of the Hague Convention, see Comment, The Effect of the Hague Convention
on Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, 2 CoR-
NELL INT'L L.J. 125 (1969).
196. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. at 310, 319 (1945).
197. See supra notes 165-186 and accompanying text.
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trials and depositions. 98 The provisions dealing with subpoenas in the
Oklahoma Pleading Code are found in section 2004 and are based on
the provisions of rule 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The
form of subpoenas, specified in section 2004(J),199 requires that the sub-
poena state the name of the court, the title of the action, and the time
and place where the witness is required to attend and give his testi-
mony. The subpoena may also describe any books, papers, documents,
or tangible things that the witness is required to produce.2°° The clerk
of the court is authorized to issue blank subpoena forms under the seal
of the court, and a party seeking the attendance of a witness must com-
plete the forms before they are served on the witnesses.01
Section 2004(L)212 provides that subpoenas may be served by any
198. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1279 (5th ed. 1979). Technically, a subpoena duces tecum is
the type of subpoena used to produce documents within a witness' possession. Id See generally
Minnis, Civil Discovery in Oklahoma Revisited Under the New Code, 18 TULSA L.J. 173 (1982).
199. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2004(J) (Supp. 1984) provides:
SUBPOENA FOR ATTENDANCE OF WITNESSES; FORM; ISSUANCE. Every subpoena
shall be issued by the clerk under the seal of the court, shall state the name of the court
and the title of the action, and shall command each person to whom it is directed to
attend and give testimony at a time and place therein specified. The clerk shall issue a
subpoena, or a subpoena for the production of documentary evidence, signed and sealed
but otherwise in blank, to a party requesting it, who shall fill it in before service.
200. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2004(K) (Supp. 1984) provides:
SUBPOENA FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE. A subpoena may also com-
mand the person to whom it is directed to produce the books, papers, documents, or
tangible things designated therein; but the court, upon motion made promptly and in any
event at or before the time specified in the subpoena for compliance therewith, may:
1. Quash or modify the subpoena if it is unreasonable and oppressive; or
2. Condition denial of the motion upon the advancement, by the person in whose
behalf the subpoena is issued, of the reasonable cost of producing the books, papers,
documents, or tangible things.
201. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2004(J) (Supp. 1984). See supra note 194 for text of § 2004(J),
This section is identical to FED. R. Crv. P. 45(a). Moreover, this section "makes no substantive
changes in former Oklahoma law except to add provision for issuance of a blank subpoena for the
production of documents." OKLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 12, § 2004, Committee Comment to Section
2004 (West Supp. 1984).
202. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2004(L) (Supp. 1984) provides:
SERVICE. Service of a subpoena upon a person named therein shall be made by
delivering or mailing a copy thereof to such person and by tendering to him the fees for
one (I) day's attendance and the mileage allowed by law. Service of a subpoena may be
accomplished by any person who is eighteen (18) years of age or older. Service of a
subpoena by mail may be accomplished by mailing a copy thereof by certified mail with
return receipt rejuested and delivery restricted to the person named in the subpoena.
The person serving the subpoena shall make proof of service thereof to the court
promptly and, in any event, before the witness is required to testify at the hearing or
trial. If service is made by a person other than a sheriff or deputy sheriff, such person
shall make affidavit thereof. If service is by mail, the person serving the subpoena shall
show in his proof of service the date and place of mailing and attach a copy of the return
receipt showing that the mailing was accepted. Failure to make proof of service does not
affect the validity of the service, but service of a subpoena by mail shall not be effective if
the mailing was not accepted by the person named in the subpoena. Costs of service
shall be allowed whether service is made by the sheriff, his deputy, or any other person.
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person who is eighteen years of age or older, either by personal delivery
or by certified mail with return receipt requested and delivery restricted
to the witness. 20 3 Unlike service of a summons and petition,2° service
of a subpoena by mail is effective only if the witness accepts delivery of
the subpoena. When the subpoena is served, it must be accompanied
by the witness fees for one day's attendance and mileage, as prescribed
in section 81 of title 28 of the Oklahoma Statutes.2 °5 Formerly title 12,
section 386 of the Oklahoma Statutes20 6 placed no age limitation on the
person serving the subpoena, and title 12, section 391207 provided for
payment of witness fees only if the witness demanded them. Section
2004(L) also provides that proof of service must be filed with the court
after service is accomplished and before the witness is required to at-
tend. Proof of service must be by affidavit, unless service was made by
a sheriff or deputy sheriff, and must include a copy of the return receipt
if service was by mail.
The major change achieved by the Oklahoma Pleading Code
which affects subpoenas is found in section 2004(N), 20 8 which extends
the range of service of subpoenas for trials to the boundaries of the
State of Oklahoma. Previously, the range of subpoenas for Oklahoma
state courts was limited to the county of residence of the witness, to an
adjoining county, or to the county where he was served unless the sub-
poena was issued by a state governmental entity.20 9 If the witness is not
a resident of the county where the trial is being held, his testimony may
also be presented by deposition.210 However, the range of subpoenas
for depositions is not affected by the Oklahoma Pleading Code and
When the subpoena is issued on behalf of a state department, board, commission, or
legislative committee, fees and mileage shall be paid to the witness at the conclusion of
the testimony out of funds appropriated to the state department, board, commission, or
legislative committee.
203. Id
204. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
205. OKLA. STAT. tit. 28, § 81 (1981). Currently, section 81 provides for an allowance of $0.15
per mile and daily witness fees of $5.00 if the witness is required to travel less than sixty (60) miles
to attend the trial or deposition, and daily witness fees of $12.00 if the distance is greater than sixty
(60) miles.
206. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 386 (1981) (repealed 1984).
207. Id § 391.
208. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2004(N) (Supp. 1984) provides:
SUBPOENA FOR A HEARING OR TRIAL. At the request of any party subpoenas for
attendance at a hearing or trial shall be issued by the clerk of the district court for the
county in which the hearing or trial is held. A subpoena requiring the attendance of a
witness at a hearing or trial may be served at any place within this state.
209. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 390 (1981) (repealed 1984).
210. Id. § 3209(A)(3)(b) (Supp. 1984), permits the testimony of a witness who is not a resident
of the county where the trial is to be held to be presented by the witness' deposition.
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continues to be restricted to the county of residence of the witness, an
adjoining county, or the county where the witness is served with the
subpoena.211
The Oklahoma Pleading Code does not specify any time for ser-
vice of a subpoena, and conceivably, the subpoena could be served on a
witness very shortly before he is required to testify at the trial or depo-
sition. 12 A reasonable lead time should be given the witness, though,
to avoid antagonizing him unnecessarily. Moreover, because there
may be difficulties in serving the subpoena, the party calling the witness
should allow adequate time to make more than one attempt at service.
Unlike subpoenas for trial, which are issued in blank and may be
served without any authorization from the court clerk,21 3 subpoenas for
depositions may be issued by the court clerk only after filing with the
clerk a proof of service of a notice to take the deposition.214 The notice
of deposition must state the name and address of the witness, if known,
describe any documents to be produced, and be served on the parties to
the action in a sufficient period of time before the date of the deposition
211. Id §3207(B)(1).
212. But Vf. former OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 389 (1981) (repealed 1984) (required service of a
subpoena at least three days before trial or deposition).
213. See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
214. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2004(M) (Supp. 1984) provides:
SUBPOENA FOR TAKING DEPOSITIONS; PLACE OF EXAMINATION.
Proof of service of a notice to take a deposition as provided in subsection C of
Section 3207 and subsection A of Section 3208 of Title 12 of the Oklahoma Statutes
constitutes a sufficient authorization for the issuance by the clerk of the district court for
the county in which the deposition is to be taken of subpoenas for the persons named or
described therein. Proof of service of the notice may be made by filing, with the clerk of
the district court for the county in which the deposition is to be taken, a copy of the
notice together with a statement of the date and manner of service and the names of the
persons served, certified by the person who made service. A subpoena must be served in
the manner provided in subsection L of this section. The subpoena may command the
person to whom it is directed to produce and permit inspection and copying of desig-
nated books, papers, documents, or tangible things which constitute or contain matters
within the scope of the examination permitted by subsection B of Section 3203 of Title 12
of the Oklahoma Statutes, but in that event the subpoena will be subject to the provisions
of subsection C of Section 3203 of Title 12 of the Oklahoma Statutes and subsection K of
this section.
The person to whom the subpoena is directed may, within ten (10) days after the
service thereof or on or before the time specified in the subpoena for compliance if such
time is less than ten (10) days after service, serve upon the attorney designated in the
subpoena written objection to inspection or copying of any or all of the designated
materials. If objection is made, the party serving the subpoena shall not be entitled to
inspect and copy the materials except pursuant to an order of the court from which the
subpoena was issued. The party serving the subpoena may, if objection has been made,
move upon notice to the deponent for an order at any time before or during the taking of
the deposition.
See McDowell Ass'n v. Pennsylvania R.R., 20 F.R.D. 219, 220 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (subpoena di-
rected to deposed party was quashed because he was not named in the notice to take a deposition).
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to allow time for travel plus three days for preparation exclusive of the
day of service.215 Accordingly, all the parties to the action will gener-
ally have notice of the deposition before the witness does.
After being served with a subpoena that requires the production of
documents or tangible things, the witness may, under section 2004(K),
seek a court order before the trial or deposition either to quash or mod-
ify the subpoena if it is unreasonable or oppressive, 216 or to require the
party who served the subpoena to pay the reasonable costs of produc-
tion as a condition to its enforcement. 217  The witness, who has the
burden of proof on the issue of whether the subpoena is unreasonable
or oppressive, 18 should urge the court to evaluate the reasonableness
of a document request in a subpoena in light of factors such as "rele-
vance, the need of the party for the documents, the breadth of the doc-
ument request, the time period covered by it, the particularity with
which the documents are described and the burden imposed. 219 If a
subpoena for deposition requiring the production of documents or tan-
gible things is served on a witness, the witness has the option of ob-
jecting to the subpoena under section 2004(M) within ten days after its
service (or, if the subpoena is served less than ten days before the depo-
sition, at any time before the deposition). Once the witness makes such
an objection, section 2004(M) requires the party serving the subpoena
to obtain a court order to secure production of the documents or tangi-
ble things. Thus, a party seeking production of numerous documents
at a deposition by subpoena directed to a nonparty witness should con-
sider serving the subpoena well in advance of the deposition, so that
215. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 3207(C)(1) (Supp. 1984).
216. See, e.g., Russ v. Ratliff, 68 F.R.D. 691, 692 (E.D. Ark. 1975) (it was "obstructive" and
"oppressive" to require production of information in FBI files concerning an alleged civil rights
violation); Broome v. Simon, 255 F. Supp. 434,437 (W.D. La. 1965) (court can modify or quash a
subpoena to protect a witness from "annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression" under FED. R.
Civ. P. 30(b), 45(b)).
217. See Republic Prods., Inc. v. American Fed'n of Musicians, 30 F.R.D. 159, 162 (S.D.N.Y.
1962) (the payment of expenses and fees was an electable alternative to a protective order). See
also Moore v. George A. Hormel & Co., 2 F.R.D. 340, 342 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) (discovering party
required to pay expenses of opposing party's attorney to attend deposition, including reasonable
attorney's fees).
218. See In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 669 F.2d
620 (10th Cir. 1982), in which the court noted that "[a] party seeking to quash a subpoena duces
tecum has a particularly heavy burden as contrasted to a party seeking only limited protection."
Id at 623. (Citing Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. City of Burlington, 351 F.2d 762, 766 (D.C. Cir.
1965), and Horizons Titanium Corp. v. Norton Co., 290 F.2d 421, 425 (1st Cir. 1961).) 4ccord
Iowa Beef Processors, Inc. v. Bagley, 601 F.2d 949 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. deniea 441 U.S. 907
(1979); Kiblen v. Retail Credit Co., 76 F.R.D. 402 (E.D. Wash. 1977).
219. United States v. IBM Corp., 83 F.R.D. 97, 104 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (subpoena for deposition
of IBM's Chairman of the Board).
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the deposing party will have time to obtain a court order, if necessary,
before the deposition takes place.
Section 2004(0)220 prescribes contempt of court as the sanction to
compel a witness to comply with a subpoena. As a practical matter,
citing a witness who disobeyed a subpoena for contempt of court will
not aid the party who was deprived of the testimony of the witness.
Nevertheless, the contempt sanction generally operates satisfactorily as
an in terrorem device to compel attendance. Moreover, it is usually
advisable to subpoena even friendly witnesses because a party will gen-
erally be allowed a continuance of the trial if a witness fails to appear
only if he can show that the witness has been served with a
subpoena.2 2'
IV. Lis PENDENS 222
Section 2004(P) 223 replaced sections 180 and 180.1 of title 12224
and provides for the giving of constructive notice of an action affecting
220. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2004(0) (Supp. 1984) provides: "CONTEMPT. Failure by any per-
son without adequate excuse to obey a subpoena served upon him may be deemed a contempt of
the court from which the subpoena issued."
221. See Estate of Katschor, 543 P.2d 560 (Okla. 1975), in which the court, in reversing the
denial of a continuance to a party who had attempted to serve a subpoena, held:
A continuance based on the absence of a witness or of evidence expected to be given by
him is properly refused where the applicant fails to use due diligence to procure the
witness or obtain his testimony by deposition .... However, the issuance and service of
a subpoena on a non-appearing material witness constitutes a sufficient showing of dili-
gence entitling a party needing such testimony to a continuance until it can be secured.
Id at 562.
222. "Notice of lis pendens" is a "notice filed on public record for the purpose of warning all
persons that the title to certain property is in litigation, and that they are in danger of being bound
by an adverse judgment." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 840 (5th ed. 1979).
223. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2004(P) (Supp. 1984) provides:
P. NOTICE OF PENDENCY OF ACTION. Upon the filing of a petition, the action is
pending so as to charge third persons with notice of its pendency. While an action is
pending, no third person shall acquire an interest in the subject matter of the suit as
against the plaintiffs title; except tat:
1. Notice of the pendency of an action shall have no effect unless service of
process is made upon the defendant within one hundred twenty (120) days after the
filing of the petition; and
2. No action pending in either state or federal court shall constitute notice
with respect to any real property until a notice of pendency of the action, identifying
the case and the court in which it is pending and giving the legal description of the
land affected by the action, is filed of record in the office of the county clerk where
the land is situated.
224. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 180, 180.1 (1981) (repealed 1984). Section 180 provided that third
parties were on notice of the pendency of a suit upon the filing of the petition if service was within
sixty (60) days of filing. Section 180.1 provided that notice of a pending suit was ineffective until
notice was filed in the office of the county clerk. See generally Comment, Annual Survey of
Oklahoma Law: New Pendente Lite Provision-Inchoate Judgment Lien, 3 OKLA. CITY U.L, REV.
356, 388 (1978) (discussion of the ambiguities in § 180.1).
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real property by recording a notice with the land records in the county
clerk's office for the county where the real property is located. The
notice must identify the parties to the action and the court where the
action is filed, and also give a legal description of the real property
affected by the action. Once the notice of pendency of the action or lis
pendens becomes effective, subsequently acquired interests in the prop-
erty are subject to the rights of the parties to the action as determined
by the court. Although a lis pendens is not a lien on real property,225
the constructive notice provided by the lis pendens serves to
subordinate the rights of subsequent purchasers and lienors to the
rights of the parties to the action.226
If service of summons on the defendant is made within 120 days
after the filing of the petition, the lis pendens dates from the time it is
recorded even if recordation occurred before service of the sum-
mons. 227 If the summons is not served within 120 days after the filing
of the petition, the lis pendens is not effective until the later of the date
of service or the date of recordation of the lis pendens.228 In addition,
if the summons is not served within 120 days after the filing of the
petition, the action is subject to dismissal under section 2004().229
V. CONCLUSION
Service of process is the means the law affords for bringing de-
fendants before the court and compelling the attendance of witnesses
and production of documents for trials and depositions. Once process
has been served in accordance with statutory and constitutional re-
quirements, a court may render a default judgment against a defendant
who fails to respond to a summons and petition, or hold a witness who
disobeys a subpoena in contempt of the court. This Article has ex-
amined the changes made by the Oklahoma Pleading Code in this fun-
damental area of civil procedure. These changes are designed to
simplify the procedures for making service of process so that actions
225. 11 Okla. Op. Att'y Gen. 423, 424 (1979), states in part: "A judgment for money only does
not become a lien on realty of judgment debtor unless and until it is duly entered upon the judg-
ment docket of the county in which the real property is located." Id (citing Knight v. Armstrong,
303 P.2d 421 (Okla. 1956)).
226. For a thorough discussion of the history and operation of the lis pendens in Oklahoma,
see Astle, An Analysis of the Evolution of Oklahoma Real Property Law Relating to Lis Pendens and
Judgment Liens, 32 OKLA. L. REV. 812, 812-24 (1979).
227. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2004(P) (Supp. 1984).
228. See Thompson v. General Outdoor Advertising Co., 194 Okla. 300, 305, 151 P.2d 379,
384 (1944); Shufeldt v. Jefcoat, 50 Okla. 790, 795-96, 151 P. 595, 597 (1915).
229. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2004(1) (Supp. 1984). See supra note 160 for text of § 2004(I).
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can be tried on their merits instead of being decided on the basis of
procedural technicalities and, at the same time, to satisfy the require-
ments of due process guaranteed by the United States Constitution. As
a result they warrant careful study by Oklahoma attorneys and judges.
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